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clause jurisprudence from the perspective of a continuing dialogue about
the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. The
term continuing dialogue suggests that even for as formidable and longtenured a jurist as Justice Stevens, important questions remain open and
unresolved. In discussing these unanswered questions, the article explores
potential dissonance between Justice Stevens’s contrasting interpretations
of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. For example,
Justice Stevens’s concern for the status and sensibilities of religious
minorities, expressed repeatedly in his Establishment Clause opinions
reviewing state-sponsored religious displays, plays a far less obvious and
focused role in his free exercise jurisprudence. Yet surely minority faiths
may suffer a similar sense of alienation when government denies them
exemptions from general laws that burden their religious practices, but not
those of the majority. Similarly, the opinions Justice Stevens joined limiting
free exercise claims reject a federal judicial role that requires subjective,
value-based balancing. Justice Stevens’s view that the Establishment Clause
requires the evaluation of legislative accommodations to determine whether
they unfairly favor certain faiths or extend too far and impose unacceptable
burdens on third parties or the public, however, would seem to involve
judges in a comparably subjective and value-laden inquiry.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional law over time is neither fixed by precedent nor
controlled by history. It is the product of a continuing constitutional
dialogue within the judiciary, and, more importantly, between the courts,
the political branches of government, and the American people. There is no
doubt that during his thirty-five-year tenure as a Justice on the United States
Supreme Court, Justice Stevens has played a significant and valued role in
that ongoing dialogue in many seriously contested areas of constitutional
law. Few disputed areas, however, have involved the intensity of
controversy or the fluidity of doctrine as the interpretation of the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.
Analyzing Justice Stevens’s religion clause jurisprudence is a difficult
undertaking not only because of the heated and enduring debate about the
meaning of these constitutional provisions, but also because the complexity
of church–state issues and the numerous values subsumed by them makes it
hard to develop coherent and effective doctrine to resolve these disputes.
Moreover, the opinions of any Supreme Court Justice, even one who has
been on the Court as long as Justice Stevens, provide only an incomplete
picture of the Justice’s perspective on multifaceted constitutional questions.
Supreme Court opinions focus on specific cases and provide only limited
opportunities for direct exchanges between Justices or follow-up inquiries.
The give and take of protracted argument is precluded by the form and
function of the proceedings. There can be only so many “but what about
this argument” inquiries directed back and forth among the written opinions
of the majority, concurring, and dissenting Justices.
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The goal of this Article is to attempt to continue the dialogue beyond
the scope of Justice Stevens’s opinions and to extend our understanding of
his religion clause jurisprudence. This Article begins by identifying the
principles and values underlying Justice Stevens’s perspective that we can
ascertain with some degree of confidence. That foundation will be followed
by critical inquiries challenging the connection between these values and
principles and various holdings and doctrine Justice Stevens supported in
his opinions.
So far the analysis is on fairly solid ground. At this point, however, the
discussion will become unavoidably tentative and speculative, at least to
some extent. There are serious rejoinders to these inquiries. The opinions
Justice Stevens wrote or joined may give some basis for describing the
responses he would offer, but it is impossible to determine how he would
reply with any degree of certainty. Moreover, as the discussion progresses
and responses to responses are considered, the relationship between what
we know about Justice Stevens’s understanding of the religion clauses and
the arguments presented in this Article become increasingly attenuated.
Thus, what this Article presents is an extrapolation of the debate
surrounding Justice Stevens’s religion clause jurisprudence that identifies
areas of inquiry to pursue as the constitutional dialogue continues.
Parts I, II, and III of this Article describe the substance of Justice
Stevens’s religion clause jurisprudence as it is expounded in the many
opinions he authored or joined. Part I examines Justice Stevens’s support
for the rigorous enforcement of Establishment Clause principles limiting the
government’s ability to promote religion through financial subsidies and
state-sponsored prayers or religious displays. Part II analyzes Justice
Stevens’s less interventionist approach to free exercise claims and his
reluctance to protect free exercise rights against neutral laws of general
applicability that substantially burden religious practice. Part III describes
Justice Stevens’s position that the Establishment Clause requires judicial
vigilance in reviewing discretionary religious exemptions provided by the
political branches of government in order to determine whether such
accommodations go too far in imposing costs on third parties or unfairly
favor certain faiths over others.
The discussion in all three Parts attempts to identify the values that
distinguish and explain Justice Stevens’s interpretation of the religion
clauses. This analysis suggests that religious equality was Justice Stevens’s
dominant, but not his exclusive, concern. Justice Stevens rejected statesponsored prayer and religious displays because they offended and
alienated religious minorities and non-religious Americans. He challenged
both financial and expressive promotion of religion because such state
support increased religious fragmentation and divisions in our society to the
disadvantage of smaller faiths. He opposed constitutionally mandated
religious exemptions because they risked the favoring of more familiar
faiths and the marginalization of less conventional religions. For similar
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reasons, he argued that discretionary accommodations by the political
branches of government must be carefully evaluated to ensure that they do
not unfairly provide preferential protection to certain faiths while
unacceptably burdening people of other faiths or no faith with their cost.
In addition, Justice Stevens doubted the ability of the courts to
competently and impartially balance free exercise rights and competing
state interests. Such ad hoc and subjective balancing of the religious liberty
of private individuals and groups against the public good exceeded the
ability of judges and inappropriately intruded into legislative prerogatives.
It also risked decisions that favored more common faiths while slighting the
interests of less familiar religions.
Part IV of this Article identifies unanswered questions arising out of
Justice Stevens’s opinions and constructs a back and forth dialogue to
discuss them. Why, we may ask, does Justice Stevens’s concern for the
sensibilities of religious minorities and the dangers of religious divisiveness
justify the review and invalidation of state-sponsored religious displays and
prayers that endorse majoritarian beliefs but not laws that unnecessarily
burden the practices of minority faiths? Isn’t it equally likely that neutral
laws of general applicability that avoid interfering with the religious
practices of larger faiths but substantially burden the practices of smaller
religions will offend and alienate minorities whose right to practice their
faith is ignored? Aren’t political debates about accommodating or refusing
to accommodate religious practices as divisive as debates about the content
of religious displays?
The possible responses to these questions are varied. Even if the denial
of free exercise accommodations causes offense and increases religious
divisions in our society, there may be other reasons why courts review the
constitutionality of religious displays under the Establishment Clause yet
assign the evaluation of free exercise claims for accommodation to the
political branches of government. Free exercise disputes may be harder to
avoid than religious display cases. More importantly, their resolution may
be more unpredictable and subjective than challenges to state-sponsored
religious displays and public prayers.
These explanations, however, are also subject to challenge. It is by no
means clear that determining whether a state-sponsored religious message
constitutes a prohibited endorsement of religion is less subjective and more
predictable an undertaking than balancing free exercise claims against the
state’s interests in denying requested accommodations. Moreover, some
form of balancing of religious exercise and competing state interests may be
an unavoidable cost under Justice Stevens’s understanding of the religion
clauses—even if free exercise accommodation decisions are initially
assigned to the political branches of government. Justice Stevens believes
the federal courts have significant oversight responsibilities under the
Establishment Clause to ensure that discretionary political accommodations
do not unequally favor certain faiths over others or go too far in burdening
608
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nonbeneficiaries with their cost. It is not at all clear that courts can fulfill
those responsibilities without engaging in the same kind of a subjective and
value-laden analysis that is intrinsic to the adjudication of free exercise
claims.
Part IV does not attempt to definitively answer these questions. Its goal
is to present a constitutional dialogue addressing the unresolved issues
inspired by Justice Stevens’s religion clause jurisprudence.
I.

RIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONSTRAINTS
ON GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF RELIGION
There is no doubt that Justice Stevens viewed the Establishment Clause
as a formidable constitutional barrier to the government’s promotion of
religion. Justice Stevens’s commitment to the “no aid” principle restricting
government subsidies to religious institutions and activities was broadbased and unwavering. More than any of his brethren, he insisted that laws
must have a clear or primary secular purpose. He was equally adamant in
arguing that in most cases, state-sponsored prayer and religious displays
impermissibly endorsed certain religious beliefs and communities while
disfavoring others. The values underlying these interpretations of the
Establishment Clause reflected both religious liberty and religious equality
interests, but Justice Stevens clearly emphasized equality more than liberty
as the controlling concern of his jurisprudence.
A. No Aid to Religion Means NO Aid to Religion
Justice Stevens supported the rigorous enforcement of Establishment
Clause principles restricting government’s ability to subsidize religious
institutions and activities. In cases involving financial aid to religion,
particularly to religious schools, Justice Stevens insisted that the wall
separating church and state should be high, consistently enforced, and
virtually impregnable.1 It did not matter whether aid was direct or whether it
depended on the independent choice of private individuals—government
funds could not be used to subsidize religious education.2 Aid to religious
colleges was suspect as well as aid to elementary or secondary schools.3 Aid
1

See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 265–66 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works,
426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The only case in which Justice Stevens voted to
uphold state aid to religion was Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 482 (1986), which upheld a state program providing financial assistance to a blind person who
wanted to study at a Christian college to pursue a career as a pastor, missionary, or youth director.
2
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 685 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404 (1983) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
3
See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 404–05 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting); Roemer, 426 U.S. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that served important secular goals, such as fire prevention, could not be
provided to religious institutions if it assisted their religious mission.4
Justice Stevens sharply criticized the Court’s ad hoc and incoherent
willingness to uphold some aid programs while striking down others instead
of adhering to the inflexible “no aid” principle the Constitution required.5
The justifications for Justice Stevens’s commitment to an
insurmountable barrier to government aid to religion are less clearly stated
than the consistent “no aid” position he endorsed. If we look at the opinions
Justice Stevens authored, we note two particular rationales for prohibiting
aid to religion. First, state aid to religious institutions made them dependent
on government support and vulnerable to state control. Thus, in Roemer v.
Board of Public Works, Justice Stevens emphasized “the pernicious
tendency of a state subsidy to tempt religious schools to compromise their
religious mission without wholly abandoning it.”6 In Wolman v. Walter, he
pointed to several aid provisions which illustrated this concern. For
example, in order “[t]o qualify for aid, sectarian schools must relinquish
their religious exclusivity” in admitting students or hiring teachers.7 In
addition, Justice Stevens explained, “sectarian schools will be under
pressure to avoid textbooks which present a religious perspective on secular
subjects, so as to obtain the free textbooks provided by the State.”8
Second, Justice Stevens believed that the use of state funds to subsidize
religion would contribute to religious divisions in our society as different
religious factions sought to maximize their access to government support.
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, Stevens referred to religious strife in Europe
that led to early immigration to America and to religious conflicts in
various parts of the world today.9 “Whenever we remove a brick from the
wall that was designed to separate religion and government, we increase the
risk of religious strife and weaken the foundation of our democracy.”10
Finally, if we expand our inquiry to include opinions that Justice
Stevens joined, we see that Justice Stevens identified a third justification for
prohibiting state aid to religion: protecting the taxpayer’s liberty interest in
not subsidizing the promulgation of religion, particularly faiths other than
his own. “[C]ompelling an individual to support religion violates the
fundamental principle of freedom of conscience. Madison’s and Jefferson’s
now familiar words establish clearly that liberty of personal conviction

4

See Regan, 444 U.S. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 265 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6
426 U.S. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 266 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8
Id.
9
536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10
Id.
5
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requires freedom from coercion to support religion, and this means that the
government can compel no aid to fund it.”11
These justifications for the demanding “no aid” principle that Justice
Stevens endorsed are seldom emphasized when the Justice’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is described and evaluated.12 As will be evident
shortly, many of Justice Stevens’s Establishment Clause opinions focus on
religious equality as a critical constitutional value and goal.13 The
foundation for Justice Stevens’s position prohibiting state aid to religion,
however, is religious liberty—the liberty of the taxpayer who challenges the
government’s use of her tax dollars to subsidize other faiths, and the liberty
of religious institutions and communities to be free from the dependency
and control that inevitably follows the acceptance of government support.14
B. The Secular Purpose Requirement
Justice Stevens interpreted the Establishment Clause to require the
invalidation of laws that lacked a “clearly” or “primary” secular purpose.15
A law’s purpose under his analysis did not require an inquiry into the
personal religious beliefs of the legislator. Thus, the fact that a legislator
believed that free speech is a good thing for religious reasons would not
require the invalidation of statutes facilitating speech under the
Establishment Clause.16 The utility and purpose of statutes facilitating
speech can be explained without acknowledging the value or truth of
religious beliefs. Also, the fact that a law resulted in some incidental secular
consequences did not establish the law’s secular purpose.17 A law requiring
school children to recite Protestant prayers at public school would not be
understood to serve a secular purpose because of the perceived promotion
of moral values that result from doing so.18 Such a law presupposed the

11

Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 870 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); accord
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that “no one ‘shall be compelled to . . . support
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever’” (alteration in original) (quoting THOMAS
JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1779))); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 868 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Using public funds for the
direct subsidization of preaching the word is categorically forbidden under the Establishment
Clause . . . .”); Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Treating Religion as Speech: Justice Stevens’s Religion
Clause Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2243 (2006).
12
See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice Stevens, Religious Freedom, and the Value of Equal
Membership, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177 (2006) (discussing the equality-based principles of Justice
Stevens’s and Justice O’Connor’s religion clause jurisprudence).
13
See infra notes 28–64 and accompanying text.
14
See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text.
15
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 284–86 nn.19 & 21 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
16
See id. at 285 n.21.
17
See id. at 286 n.21.
18
See id.
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value of religious observance or the truth of religious belief as the basis for
achieving such benefits. To Justice Stevens, a challenged law serves a
religious purpose if it “reflects a judgment that it would be desirable for
people to be religious or to adhere to a particular religion.”19
The methodology a court may employ to determine whether or not a
law has a secular purpose raises numerous issues,20 most of which are
beyond the scope of this Article. A less obvious, but equally important,
question might focus on the nature of the interest that is burdened when
government adopts laws that serve religious purposes. Because Justice
Stevens takes a particularly aggressive position in evaluating laws alleged
to lack a secular purpose, this issue is more difficult to answer for Justice
Stevens’s jurisprudence than it is for other Justices who interpret this
Establishment Clause requirement more narrowly.
For example, Justice Stevens was the lone member of the Court who
argued that some laws restricting a woman’s ability to choose to have an
abortion violated the Establishment Clause because the laws lacked a
secular purpose. In essence, Justice Stevens argued that no secular
arguments exist supporting a state’s position that protecting fetal life is
equally compelling from conception to birth,21 or that there is a reason to
differentiate between contraceptives that prevent fertilization and devices
that prevent the implantation of the fertilized egg in the uterine wall.22
Given the frequently asserted theological arguments supporting these
contentions, Justice Stevens concluded that laws grounded on either
assumption further religious rather than secular purposes.23

19

Id.
See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861–64 (2005); Andrew Koppelman,
Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 98–102 (2002) (discussing four objections to the secular purpose
requirement).
21
See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 778 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
22
See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 563–66 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
23
Id. at 566–69.
20
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Putting aside the merits of Justice Stevens’s analysis,24 we can ask
what constitutionally cognizable harm is done if his analysis is correct and
if certain antiabortion laws serve a religious purpose. One answer focuses
on religious liberty concerns. The state cannot require individuals to
conform their decisions about how they want to live their lives to the tenets
of a particular religious faith. This aspect of a secular purpose analysis
resonates with the Court’s language in Epperson v. Arkansas (affirmed in
Edwards v. Agullard25) that “the First Amendment does not permit the State
to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or
prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.”26 In the context of laws
prohibiting abortion, one might paraphrase this quote to state that the First
Amendment does not permit the State to require that a woman’s decision
whether or not to bear a child must be tailored to the principles or
prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.27
While the secular purpose requirement may protect individual liberty
in some cases, in many other circumstances it primarily protects religious
equality. Indeed, equality concerns appear to be the controlling interest in
several secular purpose opinions that Justice Stevens has written or joined.
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, for example, Justice Stevens
argued that the preamble to a Missouri statute defining conception violated
the Establishment Clause because it lacked a secular purpose even if the
statutory language “merely makes legislative findings without operative
effect.”28 A law without operative effect cannot abridge liberty, but it can
offend religious equality principles. The language in the Missouri statute
was unconstitutional because it was “an unequivocal endorsement of a
religious tenet of some but by no means all Christian faiths,”29 and injected

24

There is significant philosophical debate about the morality of abortion, which extends beyond
exclusively theological arguments. See generally JONATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING
LIVES (reprt. 1990) (discussing moral and philosophical problems around killing, including the issues of
abortion, infanticide, war, and euthanasia); ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, BEGINNING LIVES (reprt. 1988)
(discussing and seeking to refute several of the prevailing moral philosophical positions in support of
abortion); L.W. SUMNER, ABORTION AND MORAL THEORY (1981) (discarding extreme liberal and
conservative views on abortion in favor a moderate approach and defending utilitarianism as a
philosophical rationale for a moderate view); THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION (Susan Dwyer & Joel
Feinberg eds., 1997) (collecting essays on both sides of the philosophical debate surrounding abortion);
WHAT IS A PERSON? (Michael F. Goodman ed., 1988) (collecting essays on the philosophical
underpinnings of personhood and their relationship to the abortion debate).
25
482 U.S. 578, 591 (1987).
26
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968).
27
The secular purpose requirement also arguably protects a liberty interest in meaningful
participation in the political development of law. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of
the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1613 (1993).
28
492 U.S. at 571 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29
Id. at 566.
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the state legislature’s “endorsement of a particular religious tradition” into
the abortion debate.30
Similarly, Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Wallace v.
Jaffree, striking down an Alabama statute requiring elementary school
children to observe a moment of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer
on the grounds that the law lacked a secular purpose.31 Because the
compliance of children with this statute cannot be observed and policed—
the teacher can determine if they are silent but not what they are thinking—
it is difficult to argue that this law burdened religious liberty in any
meaningful sense. The constitutional defect in the law is grounded in
equality, not liberty, concerns. Thus, Justice Stevens explained that the
statute served a religious purpose because it “was enacted to convey a
message of state endorsement and promotion of prayer.”32 Rather than
maintaining a posture of neutrality toward religion, the state’s intention in
adopting this statute was “to characterize prayer as a favored practice.”33
Justice Stevens’s long discussion of the secular purpose requirement in
his dissent in Board of Education v. Mergens34 is also based on equality
principles. Justice Stevens argued that the congressional focus in enacting
the Equal Access Act, which required local school districts to permit
student religious groups to meet on secondary school premises, raised
serious questions about the statute’s secular purpose.35 Ultimately, however,
the equal treatment required by the law satisfied his concerns. The
Establishment Clause does not prohibit Congress or local school districts
from “bring[ing] organized religion into the schools so long as all groups,
religious or not, are welcomed equally.”36
Religious equality is also the cornerstone of the Court’s inquiry into
government purpose in religious display cases. Justice Souter’s majority
opinion in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, which Justice Stevens
joined, emphasized the connection between the requirement that laws must
have a secular purpose and the constitutional commitment to neutrality
among faiths and between religion and irreligion.37 Thus, Justice Souter
explained that the secular purpose requirement “aims at preventing
[government] from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of
promoting a particular point of view in religious matters.”38 The Ten
30

Id. at 571.
472 U.S. 38, 59–61 (1985).
32
Id. at 59.
33
Id. at 60.
34
496 U.S. 226, 285–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35
See id. at 287.
36
Id. at 288.
37
545 U.S. 844, 859–60 (2005).
38
Id. at 860 (alteration in original) (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
31
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Commandments display at issue failed this requirement because it
expressed a clear preference for particular religious beliefs. To the majority,
a reasonable observer viewing the display in context “could only think that
the Counties meant to emphasize and celebrate the Commandments’
religious message.”39
Unlike his reasoning in state-aid-to-religion cases, Justice Stevens’s
discussion of the secular purpose requirement emphasized religious equality
over religious liberty concerns. Laws that served religious purposes
typically favored religious believers over nonbelievers or adherents of
certain faiths over others. As the next section demonstrates, however,
Justice Stevens’s commitment to religious equality and his challenge to
laws that marginalized and alienated religious minorities were most
vigorously asserted in cases involving state-sponsored prayer or religious
displays.
C. The Anti-Endorsement Presumption Against State-Sponsored Prayer
and Religious Displays
Secular purpose analysis aside, Justice Stevens’s commitment to
religious equality is particularly evident in his opinions reviewing religious
displays on public property or government-sponsored prayer. To Justice
Stevens, government-sponsored religious displays or prayers necessarily
expressed a message favoring some faith or faiths over others. Such state
affirmation of certain religions and disrespect of others fragments citizens
along religious lines and increases religious divisiveness in our society. For
these reasons, Justice Stevens argued for a strong presumption against the
display of religious symbols on public property or government-sponsored
prayers at public events.
This position permeates Justice Stevens’s opinions and those he joined.
For example, in Lynch v. Donnelly, the case upholding a governmentsponsored Christmas display including a nativity scene as well as less
sectarian Christmas symbols, Justice Stevens joined Justice Brennan’s and
Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinions.40 Justice Brennan argued that the
nativity scene “serves to reinforce the sense that the city means to express
solidarity with the Christian message of the crèche and to dismiss other
faiths as unworthy of similar attention and support.”41 Justice Blackmun
argued similarly against upholding the inclusion of the nativity scene
because “non-Christians [would] feel alienated by its presence.”42
Much more often, Justice Stevens spoke in his own voice. In Marsh v.
Chambers, he dissented from the Court’s decision upholding the
39
40
41
42

Id. at 869.
465 U.S. 668, 670–72 (1984).
Id. at 713 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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appointment of a chaplain selected by a Legislative Council and paid with
public funds to offer prayers at the beginning of each session of the
Nebraska state legislature.43 Commenting on the extended sixteen-year
tenure of a Presbyterian minister as the legislature’s chaplain, Justice
Stevens explained that “the designation of a member of one religious faith
to serve as the sole official chaplain of a state legislature for a period of 16
years constitutes the preference of one faith over another in violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”44 Justice Stevens chided the
majority for its unwillingness “to acknowledge that the tenure of the
chaplain must inevitably be conditioned on the acceptability of . . . [his
prayers] to the silent majority.”45
In 1989 in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,
Justice Stevens concurred in the Court’s holding that a stand-alone crèche
in a prominent location in the county courthouse violated the Establishment
Clause.46 He dissented, however, from the holding that a large, citysponsored Chanukah menorah and Christmas tree outside a government
office building did not violate Establishment Clause requirements.47 To
Justice Stevens, government sponsorship of religious displays was
constitutionally problematic because of the government disposition it
communicated. Thus, he wrote, “[t]reatment of a symbol of a particular
tradition demonstrates one’s attitude toward that tradition.”48 Such displays
had “the purpose and effect of providing support for specific faiths”49 and
risked “offend[ing] nonmembers of the faith being advertised as well as
adherents who consider the particular advertisement disrespectful.”50
Offense was not the only harm to be avoided. Government-sponsored
religious displays were intrinsically divisive. If government can endorse
favored religious beliefs, religious status becomes a political spoil to be
fought over and captured by religious factions in our society. Thus, Justice
Stevens emphasized in Allegheny County that “displays of this kind
inevitably have a greater tendency to emphasize sincere and deeply felt
differences among individuals than to achieve an ecumenical goal. The
Establishment Clause does not allow public bodies to foment such
disagreement.”51
Eleven years later, Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Santa
Fe Independent School District v. Doe, striking down a school district
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
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Id. at 823.
Id. at 823–24.
492 U.S. 573, 654 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 651.
Id.
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policy delegating to the student body the authority to decide through an
election whether a prayer should be offered before high school football
games and, if so, the student speaker who would deliver it.52 The
constitutional defects and impermissible consequences resulting from this
policy were plain to Justice Stevens: “School sponsorship of a religious
message is impermissible because it sends the ancillary message to
members of the audience who are nonadherants ‘that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherants that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.’”53 Moreover, the election procedure itself “encourages
divisiveness along religious lines in a public school setting, a result at odds
with the Establishment Clause.”54
Justice Stevens provided his most complete discussion of this issue in
his dissenting opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, a case upholding state
sponsorship of a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the
Texas State Capitol.55 Put simply, he explained, “the Establishment Clause
demands . . . [that] government may not exercise a preference for one
religious faith over another.”56 This constitutional mandate requires
government to treat members of all faiths with equal respect. The state
cannot provide “comfort, even inspiration, to many individuals who
subscribe to particular faiths,” while simultaneously offending nonmembers
of those faiths who are treated as if their beliefs are of lesser worth.57
For Justice Stevens, this command is universal. Forcefully rejecting
Justice Scalia’s contention that the Constitution permits state preferences
for monotheistic messages, Justice Stevens insisted that the Establishment
Clause applies with equal force to all religions.58 Texas cannot
constitutionally endorse the scriptural message of the Ten Commandments
and its proclamation of the divinity of the “Judeo-Christian God” because
doing so would exclude “polytheistic sects, such as Hinduism, as well as
nontheistic religions, such as Buddhism.”59 Equal status and respect was
also guaranteed to those who reject religious beliefs. To Justice Stevens,
“the Establishment Clause requires the same respect for the atheist as it
does for the adherent of a Christian faith.”60
To Justice Stevens, religious majorities deserved no special
recognition. The people of the United States are diverse in their religious
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000).
Id. at 309–10 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
Id. at 311.
545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005).
Id. at 709 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 708.
See id. at 728–29.
Id. at 719.
Id. at 711.
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and secular beliefs.61 Accordingly, the state’s “propagation of an
unmistakably Judeo-Christian message of piety would . . . make
nonmonotheists and nonbelievers ‘feel like [outsiders] in matters of faith,
and [strangers] in the political community.’”62 The Establishment Clause
exists to prevent this kind of state-induced alienation and marginalization.
Most recently, in his dissent in Salazar v. Buono,63 Justice Stevens
summarized his position on government-sponsored religious displays and
prayers succinctly. Justice Stevens wrote:
Whether the key word is “endorsement,” “favoritism,” or “promotion,” the
essential principle remains the same. The Establishment Clause, at the very
least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of
religious belief or from “making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to
a person’s standing in the political community.”64

As the preceding discussion demonstrates, Justice Stevens interpreted
the Establishment Clause to impose serious constraints on government’s
ability to promote religion. His adherence to these principles, particularly
his advocacy for rigorous enforcement of the secular purpose requirement
and a presumption against state-sponsored prayer and religious displays,
reflected Justice Stevens’s commitment to protecting religious minorities
and nonbelievers against unequal treatment and the disparagement of their
status in the community. These concerns for minority sensibilities,
however, did not extend to the rigorous review of free exercise claims
against neutral laws of general applicability.
II. FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTIONS: EVALUATING LIBERTY CLAIMS
THROUGH AN EQUALITY PRISM
Justice Stevens strongly supported judicial vigilance and intervention
in support of Establishment Clause requirements. He was less supportive of
judicial intervention to enforce free exercise rights. Indeed, because of this
ostensible difference in constitutional commitment, Justice Stevens’s free
61

See id. at 720; see also BARRY A. KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
IDENTIFICATION SURVEY: SUMMARY REPORT 5, 23 (2009), available at http://livinginliminality.files.
wordpress.com/2009/03/aris_report_2008.pdf (presenting statistics showing an increase in the
percentage of Americans who identify as members of a non-Christian religion or as having no religion at
all in the last twenty years); PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE
SURVEY 5 (2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-studyfull.pdf (noting that the United States “is on the verge of becoming a minority Protestant country”).
According to the Pew survey, there are over 140 religions in the United States, including divisions
within religious sects.
62
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 720 (alterations in original) (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory
Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
63
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1828–42 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (evaluating the
constitutionality of a state divestment of public land on which a cross is displayed).
64
Id. at 1832 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 593–94 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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exercise jurisprudence is sometimes described as entirely one-sided and
negative in its approach to religious liberty.65
That normative generalization does not adequately describe the case
law. In free exercise cases, Justice Stevens joined the majority opinion in
supporting free exercise claims in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana
Employment Security Division66 and Frazee v. Illinois Department of
Employment Security,67 and he concurred in the judgment in Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Commission.68 He joined the dissent in O’Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz to argue for greater protection of the religious liberty of
prisoners.69 He was the only member of the Court who joined the entirety of
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, including the section focusing on the invidious legislative intent
of the Hialeah City Council.70 On the other hand, he concurred with the
majority of the Court in rejecting free exercise claims in Lee v. Weisman,71
Goldman v. Weinberger,72 and Bowen v. Roy,73 and joined majority opinions
rejecting free exercise claims in Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v.
Secretary of Labor,74 Hernandez v. Commissioner,75 Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Board of Equalization76 and Bob Jones University v. United
States.77 Justice Stevens also wrote the majority opinion in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith (Smith I)78 and joined
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith (Smith II).79
This is not a record of unfailing rejection of free exercise exemptions.
Still, far more often than not, Justice Stevens voted to deny free exercise
65

See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(criticizing Justice Stevens’s opinion as “bristl[ing] with hostility to all things religious in public life”);
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L.
REV. 993, 1010 (1990) (“The apparent explanation for [Justice Stevens’s] voting pattern is hostility to
religion.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Counting Heads on RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 7, 17–18 (1997)
(claiming that Justice Stevens, “of course, is implacably hostile to religion”). Other commentators have
described Justice Stevens as “relentlessly secularist.” Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place
of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 48 n.48 (2002).
66
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
67
489 U.S. 829 (1989).
68
480 U.S. 136, 147–48 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
69
482 U.S. 342, 354–68 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70
508 U.S. 520, 540–41 (1993).
71
505 U.S. 577, 599–609 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
72
475 U.S. 503, 510–13 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
73
476 U.S. 693, 716–23 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).
74
471 U.S. 290 (1985).
75
490 U.S. 680 (1989).
76
493 U.S. 378 (1990).
77
461 U.S. 574 (1983).
78
485 U.S. 660 (1988).
79
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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claims challenging neutral laws of general applicability. This imbalance in
results certainly is a proper place to begin an inquiry into Justice Stevens’s
free exercise jurisprudence.
When we examine Justice Stevens’s written opinions, two striking
points become apparent. First, for Justice Stevens, equality concerns are the
primary, if not the only, acceptable foundation that supports judicial
intervention to protect the free exercise of religion. There is virtually no
discussion of the need to protect religious practice and autonomy as a
liberty interest. In 1982, Justice Stevens concurred with the majority in
United States v. Lee and rejected the free exercise claim of an Amish
employer who sought an exemption from having to pay Social Security
taxes for his employees.80 In his concurring opinion, however, he argued for
a different standard of review than the one applied by the majority. Rather
than evaluating the cost and risk of granting the claimed exemption and
concluding that it was unacceptable in this case, Justice Stevens argued the
Court should hold “that there is virtually no room for a ‘constitutionally
required exemption’ on religious grounds from a valid tax law that is
entirely neutral in its general application.”81
Justice Stevens recognized that his position was in “tension” with the
Court’s holdings in Thomas and Sherbert v. Verner, two cases mandating
the award of unemployment compensation benefits to individuals whose
adherence to their religious beliefs required them to leave their jobs.82 The
holdings in Thomas and Sherbert, however, could be defended on equality
rather than religious liberty grounds. Justice Stevens explained that by
analogizing employees with a religious reason for leaving their jobs to
employees with physical impairments that made it impossible for them to
work under changed circumstances, the Court’s decisions “could be viewed
as a protection against unequal treatment rather than a grant of favored
treatment for the members of the religious sect.”83
Four years later, in Bowen, Justice Stevens concurred in the Court’s
rejection of a free exercise claim challenging the use of a child’s Social
Security number as a precondition to her receiving welfare benefits to
which she was otherwise entitled.84 Recognizing that the child’s parents
might raise additional free exercise claims in the future if they were
required to file forms containing the child’s Social Security number, Justice
Stevens explained that that these problems might be resolved under an
equality analysis.85 Accommodations are available for those who experience
difficulties in filling out required forms because of mental, physical, or
80
81
82
83
84
85
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455 U.S. 252, 254–61 (1982).
Id. at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Thomas, 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981); Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398, 399–404 (1963).
Lee, 455 U.S. at 263–64 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
476 U.S. 693, 716–23 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).
See id. at 720–21.
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linguistic handicaps.86 Accordingly, “it would seem that a religious inability
should be given no less deference [because] our recent free exercise cases
suggest that religious claims should not be disadvantaged in relation to
other claims.”87
The following year, in Hobbie, another unemployment compensation
case, Justice Stevens’s concurrence echoed these equality arguments.88
Here, Florida violated the plaintiff’s free exercise rights by treating the
plaintiff’s “religious claims less favorably than other claims.”89 Therefore, a
constitutional accommodation was “necessary to protect religious observers
against unequal treatment.”90
The second point that becomes apparent when examining Justice
Stevens’s written opinions is that in addition to focusing on equality values
as the basis for providing protection to free exercise rights in a limited class
of cases, Justice Stevens identified equality concerns as his primary
justification for rejecting any broader judicial intervention in support of
religious liberty.91 Thus, counterintuitive as it may seem initially, Justice
Stevens acknowledges protecting religious liberty more often as a goal of
the Establishment Clause than as a purpose of the Free Exercise Clause.92
Equality, not liberty, is the foundation of his free exercise jurisprudence.
Justice Stevens provides the most complete explanation of why his
concerns about religious equality require the denial of free exercise
exemptions in Goldman.93 Captain Goldman, an Air Force Officer and
Orthodox Jew, sought an exemption from the military’s uniform dress code
requirements to allow him to wear a yarmulke, a small cap or head
covering, required by his faith.94 The military did not prohibit servicemen
from wearing any religious apparel, but appeared to distinguish between
visible and nonvisible apparel, permitting only the latter.95 A yarmulke
apparently crossed the line and was visible enough to be prohibited.
Justice Stevens concurred with the majority opinion rejecting
Goldman’s free exercise claim.96 He argued that granting this exemption
would create an unacceptable risk that military personnel from other faiths
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See id. at 721.
Id. at 722.
88
480 U.S. 136, 147–48 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).
89
Id. at 148 (quoting Bowen, 476 U.S. at 722 n.17).
90
Id.
91
Indeed, as will be discussed in the next section, a similar emphasis on equality concerns seems to
control his decision to uphold or strike down discretionary legislative accommodations of religion. See
infra Part III.
92
See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text.
93
475 U.S. 503, 510–13 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
94
Id. at 504–05 (majority opinion).
95
See id. at 508–10.
96
See id. at 510–13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
87
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would not receive neutral and uniform treatment with regard to their
requests for comparable exemptions.97 As Justice Brennan’s dissenting
opinion acknowledged, the Constitution does not prohibit the armed forces
from imposing uniform dress requirements on military personnel, nor does
it mandate the granting of all requests for exemptions by members of
minority faiths obliged by their faith to wear religious apparel.98 To Justice
Brennan, this suggested a free exercise analysis pursuant to which some
requests could be granted and others denied under a multifactor analysis
taking into account the military’s concerns about “functional utility, health
and safety considerations, and the goal of a polished, professional
appearance.”99 From Justice Stevens’s perspective, however, the application
of that kind of a standard would inevitably result in personnel from some
faiths being denied exemptions while the religious obligations of members
of other faiths would be accommodated.100 Distinctions in the award of
accommodations among Jews wearing yarmulkes, Sikhs wearing turbans,
and Rastafarians wearing dreadlocks would necessarily reflect the
majority’s attitudes toward the faith seeking an exemption.101 Neither the
military nor the Court has any business in drawing such distinctions.102 The
challenged policy avoided this risk because it “[was] based on a neutral,
completely objective standard—visibility.”103
The Supreme Court’s holding in Smith II104 in 1990 vindicated the
position Justice Stevens had endorsed in his concurring opinions in United
States v. Lee105 and Goldman v. Weinberger.106 Free exercise claims could
not be asserted against neutral laws of general applicability,107 no matter
how substantial the burden on religious practice might be or how
unimportant the state’s justification for refusing to grant an
accommodation.108 The Free Exercise Clause only came into play when the

97

See id. at 512–13.
See id. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99
Id. at 519 (internal quotation marks omitted).
100
See id. at 512–13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
101
See id. Justice Blackmun agreed that basing the criteria for accommodation on whether or not
religious apparel or grooming was consistent with a polished and professional appearance would result
in discriminatory treatment in favor of mainstream religions and familiar faiths. See id. at 526–27
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
102
See id. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring).
103
Id.
104
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
105
455 U.S. 252, 261–64 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
106
475 U.S. at 510–13 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also supra notes 80–83, 103–10 and
accompanying text.
107
See Smith II, 494 U.S. at 879.
108
Cf. id. at 911, 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing the state’s interest in restricting the use
of peyote for religious purposes as “the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition” that, if
taken seriously, could have a “potentially devastating impact” on respondents’ religion).
98
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state singled out religion or a particular faith for discriminatory treatment.109
After Smith II, for free exercise purposes, religious equality was the only
constitutional game in town.110
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,111 Justice
Stevens demonstrated the strength of his commitment to religious equality
in free exercise cases and how it was informed by equal protection
principles. In Hialeah, the Court struck down a series of municipal
ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifices.112 Decided after Smith II, the
Hialeah decision necessarily grounded its analysis on religious
discrimination against a particular faith, in this case Santeria, an AfroCuban religion that uses slaughtered animals in rituals and ceremonies.113
While the challenged regulations were not discriminatory on their face,
Justice Kennedy’s opinion emphasized that the ordinances prohibiting
animal sacrifices constituted an impermissible “religious gerrymander.”114
That analysis drew support from a clear majority of the Court.115 Justice
Kennedy extended his argument, however, to include a section explicitly
grounded in equal protection concerns.116 Quoting from the record of the
City Council meeting at which the challenged ordinances were adopted,
Justice Kennedy concluded that the city’s actions were invidiously
motivated to suppress the Santeria faith.117 No Justice other than Justice
Stevens joined this section of Justice Kennedy’s opinion.118
While Justice Stevens interpreted the Free Exercise Clause so narrowly
that it provided religious individuals and institutions no protection against
neutral laws of general applicability, he recognized that the political
branches of government might grant religious accommodations in
appropriate circumstances. These discretionary accommodations, however,
must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that they did not violate
Establishment Clause requirements. Here, again, religious equality was
Justice Stevens’s primary, although not his exclusive, concern.

109

See id. at 877 (majority opinion); see also id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (assuming that
the majority viewed free exercise analysis as only applicable “to laws that expressly single out religious
practices”).
110
See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 140
(1992) (explaining that the Smith II decision “converts a constitutionally explicit liberty into a
nondiscrimination requirement”).
111
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
112
Id. at 524–28.
113
Id. at 525.
114
Id. at 535 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
115
Id. at 522.
116
See id. at 540–42.
117
See id.
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Id. at 522.

623

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

III. THE RIGOROUS REVIEW OF DISCRETIONARY ACCOMMODATIONS
If we focus exclusively on the holdings of discretionary religious
accommodations cases, Justice Stevens’s decisions provide no clear sense
of direction. Justice Stevens joined the majority opinions in Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos119 and Cutter v. Wilkinson120 upholding accommodation statutes. He
wrote a concurring opinion supporting striking down the religious
accommodation in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School
District v. Grumet121 and joined the majority of the Court in invaliding
accommodations in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,122 Larson v.
Valente,123 and Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock.124
These mixed results should not be entirely surprising. The decision to
reject free exercise claims in Smith II,125 after all, neither predicts nor
controls judicial review of discretionary accommodations under
Establishment Clause auspices. Smith II certainly does not require the
invalidation of discretionary government accommodations of the exercise of
religion. It explicitly acknowledges the possible legitimacy of such
accommodations by assigning the task of determining when particular
exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability should be granted to
the political branches of government, rather than the judiciary.126 Thus, a
Supreme Court Justice who joined the majority opinion in Smith II could
interpret the Establishment Clause to require only superficial and
deferential review of the granting of such accommodations. Under this
analysis, allocating responsibility for protecting religious liberty to the
political branches of government required, or at least permitted, the Court to
refrain from the kind of indeterminate balancing that the Smith II decision
sought to avoid. This appears to be the Establishment Clause framework
that Justice Scalia has adopted. He has voted to uphold every religious
accommodation brought before the Court that was challenged for violating
the Establishment Clause.127
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483 U.S. 327 (1987).
544 U.S. 709 (2005).
121
512 U.S. 687, 711–12 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring).
122
472 U.S. 703 (1985).
123
456 U.S. 228 (1982).
124
489 U.S. 1 (1989).
125
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
126
See id. at 890.
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See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch.
Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 743–45, 752 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 33
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment
Clause, 89 TEX. L. REV. 583, 631 (2011) (“In his almost twenty-five years on the Court, Justice Scalia
has never joined a majority to strike down a government action on Establishment Clause grounds.”).
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Justice Stevens took a very different approach. He reviewed religious
accommodations far more rigorously than Justice Scalia and voted to strike
down accommodations in Kiryas Joel,128 Estate of Thornton,129 Larson,130
and Texas Monthly131 on Establishment Clause grounds. Moreover, Justice
Stevens was the lone member of the Court to argue in City of Boerne v.
Flores that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) constituted an
unconstitutional establishment of religion.132 Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice
Stevens recognized that the Court must exercise vigilant oversight in
reviewing discretionary accommodations to determine whether they are
consistent with Establishment Clause guarantees.
Justice Stevens did not contend that all exemptions are unconstitutional
per se, however. As noted previously, he voted to uphold accommodations
in Amos133 and Cutter.134 He also spoke approvingly of the legitimacy of
some religion-specific accommodations in his dissent in Board of
Education v. Mergens.135 As Justice Stevens explained, a law serves a
permissible and “proper” purpose if it is designed to lift “a regulation that
burdens the exercise of religion, even if the resulting exemption does not
‘come packaged with benefits to secular entities.’”136 Most recently, Justice
Stevens joined the Court’s opinion interpreting RFRA in Gonzales v. O
Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, although that case did not
involve an Establishment Clause challenge to RFRA’s constitutionality.137
Because Justice Stevens recognized that the Court has important
responsibilities under the Establishment Clause to monitor the
constitutionality of discretionary religious accommodations, he and likeminded Justices had to develop a framework for adjudicating
accommodations cases. Doing so was not an easy task. Indeed, if we look at
the few opinions Justice Stevens authored in reviewing laws granting
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512 U.S. at 711–12 (Stevens, J., concurring) (striking a New York law that created a school
district for a village dominated by one religious group).
129
472 U.S. 703, 708–11 (1985) (striking Connecticut law that gave employees “an absolute and
unqualified right not to work on whatever day they designate as their Sabbath”).
130
456 U.S. 228, 256–58 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (striking a Minnesota law that imposed
registration and reporting requirements on religious organizations that solicited more than fifty percent
of their funds from nonmembers).
131
489 U.S. at 5 (striking a Texas law exempting religious periodicals from sales tax).
132
521 U.S. 507, 536–37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring), superseded by statute, Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803.
133
483 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1987) (upholding section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
allows religious nonprofit employers to discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring employees).
134
544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (upholding the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act’s
institutionalized-persons provision).
135
496 U.S. 226, 288 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136
Id. at 285 n.21 (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 338) (internal quotation marks omitted).
137
See 546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006) (applying RFRA to protect the sacramental use of a controlled
substance).
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religious exemptions, it is difficult to clearly identify a set of criteria to
consider or an analytic framework to employ.
Some of the cases seem idiosyncratic. In Kiryas Joel, for example,
Justice Stevens argued that it violated the Establishment Clause for the state
to carve out a special school district for a very religious Jewish sect in order
to facilitate the religious group’s ability to provide special education
services to its children.138 To Justice Stevens, it was unconstitutional to
“affirmatively support[] a religious sect’s interest in segregating itself and
preventing its children from associating with their neighbors.”139
In other cases, Justice Stevens’s application of Establishment Clause
principles seemed to overlap or serve as a proxy for free speech concerns.
The accommodation in Texas Monthly, for example, exempted certain
religious periodicals and books from a sales and use tax applicable to all
other publications.140 Although Justice Stevens joined Justice Brennan’s
opinion holding that the accommodation violated the Establishment
Clause,141 Justice White’s concurring opinion demonstrates that the contentdiscriminatory statute was equally vulnerable to a Press Clause challenge.142
Justice Stevens was the only member of the Court to argue in City of
Boerne that the RFRA not only exceeded Congress’s power under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also violated the Establishment
Clause.143 Justice Stevens’s brief concurring opinion suggested that RFRA’s
implicit preference for religious expression, as opposed to irreligious
expression, contributed to this latter conclusion.144 Thus, Justice Stevens
explained, while a religious organization using land for religious purposes,
such as a church, could demand an exemption from local zoning laws under
RFRA, a secular organization, such as a museum or art gallery, would not
receive similar protection.145 Justice Stevens may have chosen these
expressive land-use examples of unacceptable preferences for religion over
irreligion to emphasize his concern about the state’s favoritism toward
religious speakers in the marketplace of ideas.
The attempt to identify critical factors that influenced Justice Stevens’s
review of discretionary accommodations is not a futile enterprise, however.
Notwithstanding idiosyncrasies and free speech analogies, if we look at the
opinions Justice Stevens wrote or joined in accommodations cases, we may
identify two constitutional concerns that are repeatedly recognized. One
relates to religious equality, a core concern that is reflected throughout
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
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Justice Stevens’s religion clause jurisprudence.146 The other concern focuses
on the impact of accommodations on nonbeneficiaries who bear the cost of
regulatory exemptions.147
To Justice Stevens, equality of treatment among faiths was essential to
the evaluation of religious accommodations under the Establishment
Clause. Thus, for example, Justice Stevens joined Justice Brennan’s opinion
striking down a discriminatory exemption in Larson.148 That analysis stated
in ringing terms that “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause
is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another.”149 Justice Stevens joined Justice Souter’s opinion striking down
the accommodation in Kiryas Joel in part because of the risk that the
legislature’s action in creating a separate school district for a particular
religious faith might reflect a preference for “one religion to another, or
religion to irreligion.”150 More importantly, in his concurring opinions in
United States v. Lee151 and Goldman v. Weinberger,152 Justice Stevens
emphasized the importance of nonpreferentialism for both the judiciary and
the political branches of government. The plaintiff’s free exercise claims
must be rejected in both cases because of the “overriding [constitutional]
interest in keeping the government—whether it be the legislature or the
courts—out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of differing
religious claims.”153
Another core principle employed in the review of discretionary
accommodations is the idea that on some occasions an accommodation
simply goes too far and imposes an unacceptable burden or risk on others.
Here, for example, Justice Stevens joined the Court’s opinion in Estate of
Thornton invalidating a Connecticut law imposing an absolute prohibition
against employers requiring any of their employees to work on the
Sabbath.154 The Court held that “[t]his unyielding weighting in favor of
Sabbath observers over all other interests” violates the Establishment
Clause.155
Justice Stevens also joined Justice Brennan’s opinion striking down a
Texas statute that exempted periodicals published by a religious faith and
books consisting entirely of sacred writings from the state’s general sales
146

See supra notes 28–64 and 80–118 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 154–62 and accompanying text.
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456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982).
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Id. at 244.
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512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994).
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and use tax requirements.156 Justice Brennan explained that this exemption
violated the Establishment Clause because “[e]very tax exemption
constitutes a subsidy that affects non-qualifying taxpayers, forcing them to
become ‘indirect and vicarious donors.’”157 While broadly stated
exemptions having this subsidy effect may withstand constitutional review,
“when government directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations
that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause and that either burdens
nonbeneficiaries markedly or cannot reasonably be seen as removing a
significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion,” doing so
violates Establishment Clause guarantees.158 While it is not the sole criteria
for invalidating a religion specific accommodation, the fact that an
exemption “burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly” would seem to be a
sufficient basis for striking the law down.
Most recently, Justice Stevens joined a unanimous Court in Cutter in
upholding the prison provisions of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against an Establishment Clause
challenge.159 Notwithstanding the broad coverage of the statute, the rigorous
standard of review it requires for laws that substantially burden prisoners’
free exercise rights, and the fact that the law did not extend to secular
activity, the Court rejected Ohio’s contention that the RLUIPA was
unconstitutional on its face because it impermissibly advanced religion.160 In
reaching this conclusion, however, the Court went out of its way to describe
the way in which RLUIPA must be interpreted in order to withstand an asapplied challenge.
Thus, the Court explained, “[p]roperly applying RLUIPA, courts must
take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may
impose on nonbeneficiaries, and they must be satisfied that the Act’s
prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally among different
faiths.”161 Later in the opinion, the Court emphasized that “[s]hould inmate
requests for religious accommodations become excessive, impose
unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the
effective functioning of an institution, the facility would be free to resist the
imposition. In that event, adjudication in as-applied challenges would be in
order.”162 This cautionary language explicitly reinforces the Court’s and
Justice Stevens’s concern that an accommodation can impose too great a
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See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989).
Id. at 14 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
158
Id. at 15.
159
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).
160
See id. at 720–24.
161
Id. (citation omitted).
162
Id. at 726.
157
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burden on the public or particular third parties, or operate too unfairly and
unequally, to withstand constitutional review.
In a sense, both the review of accommodations to determine if they
single out particular faiths for preferential treatment and the evaluation of
accommodations to determine if they go too far in burdening
nonbeneficiaries serve equality values. The former, of course, does so
directly by invalidating denominational favoritism. The latter prevents
government from unfairly burdening nonreligious individuals with the costs
incurred in accommodating the religious practices of others.
IV. CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE: CRITICAL INQUIRIES AND
EXTRAPOLATIONS
Justice Stevens’s limited commitment to protecting religious liberty
under the Free Exercise Clause and his emphasis on equality values rather
than liberty values in interpreting both of the religion clauses raise a host of
questions that cannot be convincingly answered by examining Justice
Stevens’s many opinions. Justice Stevens forcefully explained the
foundational principles that underlay his rigorous commitment to
Establishment Clause doctrine. He also identified the critical concerns that,
in his judgment, cast doubt on the legitimacy and utility of judicial
intervention to protect the free exercise of religion. The connection between
the principles defining his Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the
concerns he expressed about free exercise accommodations were seldom
discussed, however. Nor did Justice Stevens’s identification and analysis of
these concerns provide full closure to the debate in the courts and the larger
community about the scope of free exercise rights and the legitimacy of
discretionary accommodations.
Justice Stevens’s writings and judicial judgments represent a powerful
statement of a thesis that opens a debate about the meaning of the religion
clauses and our constitutional commitment to religious liberty and equality.
Justice Stevens’s doctrinal position supporting a vigorously enforced and
expansive interpretation of the Establishment Clause and a much more
limited and lenient understanding of free exercise rights is clearly stated, as
is his emphasis on religious equality, but not religious liberty, values. But
this description is only the beginning of the constitutional discourse on his
jurisprudence. When we read the opinions Justice Stevens has written and
joined, there is often no ongoing point and counterpoint or argument and
rebuttal completing the discussion. In response to that unfinished dialectic,
this Article attempts to continue the conversation about Justice Stevens’s
religious liberty jurisprudence. It does so in part by identifying open
questions that remain troubling, and in part by presenting counterpoints
grounded in principles Justice Stevens acknowledged to be of constitutional
significance, either directly in his own writings or indirectly by joining the
opinions of other Justices.
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A. Equality Challenges to the Denial of Free Exercise Exemptions
If we return to Goldman v. Weinberger,163 the roots of an equalitybased challenge to Justice Stevens’s free exercise jurisprudence can be
unearthed. Justice Stevens argued that beginning down the road of granting
exemptions from the military’s dress code requirements would require the
Court to evaluate religious practices and draw distinctions among faiths—a
process that would inevitably raise religious equality concerns.164 Upholding
the current neutral policy that distinguished between visible and nonvisible
additional apparel avoided the risk of unequal treatment among faiths.165
Justice Brennan dissented in Goldman and disputed Justice Stevens’s
equality analysis. To Justice Brennan, there was nothing intrinsically
neutral or evenhanded about a regulation distinguishing between visible and
nonvisible religious apparel.166 In reality, this distinction accommodated the
beliefs of majority religions in the United States, whose faiths do not
require adherents to wear distinctive and obvious apparel, but ignored
minority faiths, whose religions do impose such obligations on believers.167
Thus, Justice Brennan argued, Justice Stevens’s contention that the
contested dress code advances the uniform treatment of all faiths is
mistaken “unless uniformity means uniformly accommodating majority
religious practices and uniformly rejecting distinctive minority practices.”168
There is a limit to the extent that Justices can engage in back-and-forth
dialogue in their written opinions, and in this case Justice Stevens did not
directly respond to Justice Brennan’s argument. The lack of continued
discussion here is regrettable. This equality-based distinction between
judicial or legislative accommodations of some, but not all, minority faiths
and general laws that avoid the burdening of religious majorities while
denying accommodations to all minority religions is one of the critical fault
lines on which Justice Stevens’s free exercise jurisprudence is grounded. As
such, it deserves a full explanation and defense.
To be sure, Justice Stevens made it clear in Goldman and other cases
that his primary concern in rejecting constitutionally mandated or
discretionary religious accommodations was “keeping the government . . .
out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious
claims. The risk that government approval of some and disapproval of
others will be perceived as favoring one religion over another is an

163
164
165
166
167
168
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important risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.”169 What
is unclear is why he believes that this risk is less serious when government
adopts general and allegedly neutral laws or policies that conform to the
religious beliefs and practices of the majority while burdening members of
minority faiths. There are several possible answers to this question. I am not
certain that any of them reflect Justice Stevens’s rationale for his position.
Continuing the constitutional dialogue here requires considerable
extrapolation.
One argument that ostensibly builds on Justice Stevens’s analysis in
Goldman suggests that drafting general laws which are sensitive to the
majority’s beliefs and practices while ignoring the interests of minority
faiths is less likely to be perceived as religious favoritism than the granting
of discrete exemptions to certain faiths but not others. Neutral laws of
general applicability cause less of an affront to minorities because they are
neutral on their face and generally applicable to everyone. Thus, the
equality costs resulting from such laws are measured and tolerable. This
argument, however, is also open to question.
1. Status Disparagement and Alienation.—We cannot simply assume
that a “no accommodations” policy denying exemptions from neutral and
generally applicable laws to all minority faiths is less likely to be perceived
as religious favoritism because no minority receives preferential treatment.
As an empirical matter, this contention is certainly open to debate—with
the important caveat that everyone’s conclusions on these issues are based
on intuitions rather than data. Perhaps members of some minority faiths will
understand that the denial of exemptions they seek are based on neutral and
legitimate concerns. If the sought-after accommodation imposes serious
burdens on third parties, for example, religious individuals may believe
that, on balance, the exemption should be granted, while recognizing that its
denial does not reflect bias against their community or favoritism for larger
faiths. With regard to other exemption claims, however, as to which the
state’s basis for rejecting the claim is insubstantial, I suspect that religious
groups and individuals denied exemptions will experience that rejection as
the disfavoring of their faith. The fact that other minority faiths are also
denied accommodations will not mitigate the reality that the neutral and
generally applicable law from which an exemption is sought avoids the
burdening of majoritarian religious practices.
We can extend this discussion beyond the comparison of general
intuitions about perceptions of unequal treatment and examine the problem
of free exercise exemptions by reference to the same concerns that
exemplify Justice Stevens’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As we
169

United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment);
accord Goldman, 475 U.S. at 512–13 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the Air Force has “no
business” deciding which religious modes of dress are acceptable and which are not).
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have seen, Justice Stevens often employs Justice O’Connor’s endorsement
test in cases involving religious displays on public property.170 That test in
its essence is an equality mandate.171 It focuses, as do many of the opinions
Justice Stevens has written and joined in this area, on the sensibilities and
status of religious minorities.172 A religious display representing the tenets
of one faith or multiple faiths offends and alienates the members of other
religious groups.173 Such displays violate the Establishment Clause if they
express a message of religious preferentialism that favors certain religions
over others.174
It is fair to ask, however, whether minority faiths experience a similar
or even greater sense of offense, alienation, and unequal treatment when the
government refuses to exempt them from laws that substantially burden the
practice of their religion. Religious sensibilities may be just as injured by a
regulation interfering with liberty as they are by a display expressing a
message of inequality. Arguably, the adoption of general laws that avoid the
burdening of religious practices of majority faiths while ignoring the
interests of religious minorities also sends a message to minorities “that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community”175 that is at
least as powerful as the message conveyed by placing majoritarian religious
displays on public property. Surely, the decision to construct a road
adjacent to Native American sacred sites that makes it impossible for
believers to practice their faith may be understood to send a message of
disrespect to the adherents of the burdened faith.176 Similarly, the refusal to
exempt the members of Native American religions who use peyote in
religious rituals from laws prohibiting the possession and use of this

170

See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1832–37 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308–10 (2000); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 649 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 822–23 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171
See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, A Decent Respect for Religious Liberty and Religious Equality:
Justice O’Connor’s Interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 32 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 837, 845 n.38 (2001) (listing commentary characterizing the endorsement test as focusing on
religious equality); Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the
Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O’Connor’s Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1049,
1069 (1986) (interpreting the endorsement test as one that prohibits government from placing a “badge
of inferiority” on religious minorities).
172
See supra Part I.C.
173
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 708 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174
See id. at 709.
175
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
176
See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 441–42 (1988) (holding that
the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the government from constructing a road through part of a
National Forest traditionally used for religious purposes by American Indian tribes).
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“controlled substance”177 may be perceived as communicating the message
that this faith’s religious practices need not be taken seriously.178 The fact
that other minority faiths would be denied comparable accommodations
may do little to reduce this perception. The major faiths in the United States
have no sacred sites in this country comparable to Native American beliefs,
and alcoholic beverages such as wine, which are used in Judeo-Christian
rituals, are not a controlled substance despite the recognized risks
associated with alcohol abuse.179
Arguably, there is a symmetry of attitudes and experiences that
underlay both Establishment and Free Exercise Clause disputes in this area.
Legislators, judges, and administrative officials who adhere to or are
familiar with the beliefs of the religious majority do not perceive
government expression of commonly accepted religious messages as
sectarian, preferential, or even religious in their content.180 Religion and
American culture merge in a way that suggests some religious ideas are

177

Smith II, 494 U.S. 872, 874, 890 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause did not protect
ceremonial ingestion of peyote from state-controlled substance law and that employees terminated for
work-related misconduct based on their use of the drug could be denied unemployment compensation).
178
See GARRETT EPPS, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 228–29 (2001).
179
See Douglas Laycock, Peyote, Wine and the First Amendment, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Oct. 4,
1989, at 876, 877–78 (explaining that when alcohol was prohibited, there were exemptions for its use for
sacramental purposes and that today, the use of alcohol is rarely prohibited). Alcohol abuse is much
more prevalent in the United States than peyote abuse. According to the National Survey of Drug Use
and Health, in 2009 1.4% of persons in the U.S. reported using peyote. Peyote: Ever Used Peyote,
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/
SAMHDA/ssvd/studies/29621/datasets/0001/variables/PEYOTE (last visited June 30, 2012). By
comparison, according to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), more than 38 million
adults in the United States engage in binge drinking (consuming four or five alcoholic drinks in a short
period of time). Excessive drinking “causes 80,000 deaths in the US each year and, in 2006 cost the
economy $223.5 billion.” Binge Drinking, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/BingeDrinking/index.html. The CDC also reports that “[i]n 2009, 10,839
people were killed in alcohol-impaired driving crashes, accounting for nearly one-third (32%) of all
traffic-related deaths in the United States.” Impaired Driving: Data & Statistics, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/Motorvehiclesafety/Impaired_Driving/data.html (last
visited June 30, 2012).
180
A blatant example of this tendency occurred in the oral argument in Salazar v. Buono, a case
involving an Establishment Clause challenge to the use of a stand-alone cross as a World War I
memorial. 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010). Justice Scalia asked incredulously, “The cross doesn’t honor
non-Christians who fought in the war? . . . It’s erected as a war memorial. I assume it is erected in honor
of all of the war dead. It’s the—the cross is the—is the most common symbol of . . . the resting place of
the dead . . . .” Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–39, Salazar, 103 S. Ct. 1803 (No. 08-472). When
counsel replied, “The cross is the most common symbol of the resting place of Christians. I have been in
Jewish cemeteries. There is never a cross on a tombstone of a Jew,” id. at 39, Justice Scalia responded
that the idea that a cross only honors Christian war dead is “an outrageous conclusion,” id.; see also
JOAN DELFATTORE, THE FOURTH R: CONFLICTS OVER RELIGION IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 14
(2004) (explaining that in the American Common Schools in the late 1830s, “daily readings from the
King James Bible, which was generally accepted by Protestants but not by Catholics and nonChristians,” was considered to be nonsectarian).
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simply what Americans believe.181 To members of minority faiths, however,
generic Protestant, Christian, and other monotheistic messages are neither
neutral nor nonpreferential. They endorse the beliefs of faiths other than
their own and implicitly reject the religious beliefs to which they adhere.182
Similarly, military authorities prohibiting the wearing of hats other
than head gear that is a standard part of a military uniform may not view
this regulation as one that discriminates in favor of Christians and against
Orthodox Jews and Sikhs. Schools, public agencies, and public employers
may not consciously recognize that scheduling sporting events, work
assignments, and public programs on Saturday rather than Sunday disfavors
religious individuals who observe Saturday as opposed to Sunday as their
Sabbath. Not scheduling activities on Sunday is just the normal way of
doing things.183 The open question is why this failure to recognize the
preferential nature of government conduct requires constitutional
intervention in the case of Establishment Clause challenges to majoritarian
religious displays while intervention is rejected in the case of free exercise
claims challenging preferential regulations that burden the religious
exercise of minority faiths.
2. Divisiveness.—Justice Stevens’s Establishment Clause concerns
about government-sponsored religious displays and prayers were not
limited to antipreferentialism values and a commitment to equality of status
for all religious faiths and nonbelievers. Justice Stevens often also
expressed serious misgivings about government decisions that increase
religious divisiveness and bring religious differences into the political
arena.184 Accordingly, here again we may ask whether political debates
about accommodating religious practice are intrinsically less divisive than
debates about public prayer and religious displays.

181

See DELFATTORE, supra note 180, at 52–53; see also id. at 69–71 (describing how the New
York Board of Regents believed that the monotheistic prayer they adopted to be recited in public schools
was normative, nonsectarian, and “a fundamental element of American heritage and
identity . . . [because] the beliefs it promoted were so widely shared that they did not appear to be
doctrinal but were simply taken for granted”); Douglas Laycock, “Noncoercive” Support for Religion:
Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37, 52 (1991) (explaining
how educational leaders in the Common Schools believed that the Protestant theology taught in public
schools was not intended to “victimize Catholics,” but was thought to be “fair to all and harmful to
none”).
182
See, e.g, DELFATTORE, supra note 180, at 15 (discussing how Catholics and some Protestants
viewed generic Protestantism taught in Common Schools in the 1800s “as a distinct religious tradition,
since it includes some faiths and excludes others”); Laycock, supra note 181, at 40, 63 (explaining that
the crèche or nativity scene is “heretical or blasphemous to Judaism and Islam” as is praying “to or in
the name of Christ”).
183
See Nakashima v. Or. State Bd. of Educ., 185 P.3d 429, 433–34 (Or. 2008).
184
See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1832 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 719–
20 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309–11 (2000).
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Certainly, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the debate about
government regulations substantially burdening religious practices and the
granting or rejecting of requests for exemptions and accommodations have
been intensely divisive. In some cases, the enactment of laws interfering
with religious practice and the rejection of exemptions has reflected
unconcealed animosity toward minority faiths. The U.S. government was
all but at war with the Mormon Church over the issue of polygamy.185 The
City of Hialeah was openly contemptuous of the Santeria faith.186 In other
cases, proponents of accommodations accuse the other side of hostility
toward religion and accommodation opponents assert the insensitive
unwillingness of religious groups to subordinate their private prerogatives
to the public good, as everyone else must do.187 Local battles over the
zoning and regulation of land to be used for religious purposes are often
bitterly contested.188 Debates over religious exemptions from civil rights
laws result in both sides feeling threatened and marginalized.189 If avoiding
185

See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 111–23 (2d ed.
2006) (describing how the federal government sought to disenfranchise Mormons, prevent Mormon
leaders from holding office, dissolve the corporate Church, and seize its property); Frederick Mark
Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Response to Stanley Hauerwas, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 167,
169–72 (1992) (describing how the Mormon Church’s rejection of polygamy was necessary to ensure its
survival).
186
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525–28 (1993).
187
In one such case, Winnifred Sullivan describes the intensity of feeling generated by the City of
Boca Raton’s belated decision to enforce regulations prohibiting anything other than flat markers that
did not extend above the ground to identify burial plots in the municipal cemetery. WINNIFRED FALLERS
SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 13–31 (2005). A local newspaper described the
cemetery plot owners and relatives supporting the regulations as demonstrating “fierce opposition to the
fancy shrines that litter the city’s graveyard.” Id. at 21. They contended that “the hodgepodge of items
[made] the place look like Coney Island.” Id. The defenders of aboveground markers were equally
outraged. As one owner of a plot with an above ground marker protested, “[A]ll I could think in my
mind was the beginning of the Holocaust. The first thing they did was . . . knocked down stones and
desecrated the cemeteries. And I felt this was trodding [sic] on my religion and trodding [sic] on the
religion of my loved one.” Id. at 44 (alterations in original).
188
See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 97 (2005)
(“RLUIPA has turned neighbor against neighbor and is one of the most religiously divisive laws ever
enacted in the United States.”); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and
Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1847–48 (2004) (“RLUIPA has generated a
backlash against church influx by communities fearful that, once settled, congregations will have an
unfettered ability to expand their operations without regard to local land-use concerns.”).
189
On the intensity of the debate over religious accommodations of objectors to same-sex marriage,
see generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas
Laycock et al. eds., 2008) (exploring the religious freedom implications that emerge when marriage is
expanded to include same-sex couples). Specific commentary illustrates the divisiveness of this issue.
See, e.g., Shannon Gilreath, Not a Moral Issue: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 205, 214 (reviewing SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra, and characterizing
demands for religious accommodations from the perspective that “every hard-won escape from the caste
[in which gays and lesbians have been placed] is propagandized into an attack on the liberty of the
people who created the caste system and put you in it”); Mary Ann Glendon, Op-Ed., For Better or for
Worse?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2004, at A14 (“Gay-marriage proponents use the language of openness,
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political divisions related to religion is a constitutional value, that concern
may apply with considerable force to regulatory exemptions as well as
religious displays.
B. The Problematic Nature of Adjudicating Free Exercise Claims
The arguments described above are hardly the last word in this
discussion. Additional important rejoinders need to be considered.
Continuing the dialogue even further from this point is necessary, but it is
also increasingly attenuated from its source. Identifying and presenting
these rejoinders draws us further and further from Justice Stevens’s
opinions and the judgments he has joined.
One possible response to the arguments I have presented regarding
alienation and divisiveness is to distinguish the adjudication of claims for
religious exemptions from challenges to government displays expressing
religious messages. While the harms caused by burdening religious practice
and endorsing favored faiths may be comparable in some ways, there are
stark differences between these constitutional claims with regard to the
ability of courts to resolve them. Even if neutral laws of general
applicability are perceived by religious minorities to be unequal and unfair,
there may be important institutional reasons why the courts are ill-suited to
evaluate free exercise challenges and provide plaintiffs the remedy they
seek.
Two basic distinctions may help to explain the differences in doctrinal
approach between Justice Stevens’s Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. First, it may be far more difficult and intrusive for
courts to police regulatory interference with religious exercise than it is for
the courts to monitor and limit government messages endorsing religion.
The former task involves constant evaluation of the basic bread-and-butter
work of government while the latter relates to state action that has little to
do with the state’s core functions. Second, adjudicating free exercise claims
may exceed the competence of courts and require them to intrude into what
are essentially legislative prerogatives. The review of government messages
endorsing religion avoids both of these concerns. We can consider each of
these related arguments in turn.
tolerance and diversity, yet one foreseeable effect of their success will be to usher in an era of
intolerance and discrimination the likes of which we have rarely seen before.”). Other cases involving
requests for exemptions often involve assertions of hostility toward a specific religion. One plaintiff in
Smith II described his feelings about his case this way: “You go to church, and then you get
terminated . . . . It is a continuation of being put down, of my people and our religion not being
recognized by you newcomers. They just riled me up to the point where I’m ready for a fight. Do you
want to fight? Okay.’” EPPS, supra note 178, at 111 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 87 n.11 (Cal. 2004) (discussing but
rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the California legislature “acted out of antipathy and spite toward the
Catholic Church” in refusing to create an exemption from the Women’s Contraceptive Equity Act for
Catholic Charities).
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1. The Unavoidability of Burdening Religious Exercise.—The
burdening of minority faiths by neutral and generally applicable laws is
unavoidable in our society. The range of religious diversity in our
communities is so vast that conflicts between law and religious practice are
inevitable. Government cannot do its job without enacting laws that burden
some faith’s religious practice.190
The problem created by government-sponsored religious displays is
arguably more limited and more susceptible to judicial management and
resolution. Government does not need to endorse religious beliefs to carry
out its core functions. Prohibiting endorsements does not impose costs on
third parties.191 Thus, enforcing the Establishment Clause in religious
display and public prayer cases interferes with government far less than
mandating exemptions from laws.
There is some truth to this contention, but it may be seriously
overstated. While government does not need to endorse religion, it often
may have legitimate reasons for expressing religious messages. Justice
Stevens explicitly recognizes that it is constitutionally permissible for
government to “acknowledg[e] the religious beliefs and practices of the
American people.”192 Further, “works of art or historic memorabilia” need
not be hidden because they contain religious content.193 Some religious
statements by government officials are acceptable because government
actors have a private as well as a public dimension to their lives, and the
two cannot always be separated or differentiated.194 Although Justice
Stevens has not opined on this issue, even strong supporters of the
separation of church and state agree that in times of national emergency or
calamity, government can express religious sentiments to the community.195
Indeed, unless one believes that the Constitution requires that all
religious references must be purged from the public life of our society (a
position Justice Stevens clearly rejects),196 some state religious expression
has been, is, and will continue to be a continuing part of American culture.
190

See, e.g., Smith II, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (“Precisely because ‘we are a cosmopolitan nation
made up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference,’ . . . we cannot afford the luxury of
deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that
does not protect [a state] interest of the highest order.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961))).
191
See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 317–19
(1996) (noting that government can effectively enforce its laws without determining the proper modes of
worship or form of church governance; it is government endorsements of religion that create conflict
and suffering).
192
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 711 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193
Id.
194
See id. at 723.
195
See William P. Marshall, The Limits of Secularism: Public Religious Expression in Moments of
National Crisis and Tragedy, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11, 31–33 (2002).
196
See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text; infra notes 225–31 and accompanying text.
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While state endorsements of religion may violate the Establishment Clause
(and I largely agree with Justice Stevens that they do), endorsements do not
come close to exhausting the set of state action communicating religious
content. Religious expression in the public sector has a place in the
constitutional scheme of things. Demanding that the government of the
United States or state and local authorities completely refrain from
communicating any religious content may be an implausible goal—just as it
is unrealistic to insist that government regulations may never interfere with
religious exercise. The problem here may not be as unavoidable as laws that
burden someone’s religious practice or conduct, but religious discourse
cannot be neatly excised from state expressive activity.197
2. The Problem of Subjective, Value-Based Balancing.—The second
distinction between claims for free exercise exemptions and Establishment
Clause challenges to state religious expression may be more persuasive in
explaining Justice Stevens’s reluctance to countenance the former cause of
action while supporting the latter kind of claim. Conflicts between neutral
laws of general applicability and religious exercise are not only inevitable
in a religiously diverse society; they are also not susceptible to resolution
through constitutionally mandated accommodations. The adjudication of
free exercise claims seeking exemptions from general laws would require
judges to employ unacceptably subjective and uncertain balancing tests that
cannot be fairly or consistently administered. Subjective balancing leads to
incoherent doctrine and unpredictable holdings. It also undermines
separation of powers principles by all but compelling judges to rely on their
personal values, backgrounds, and policy preferences in adjudicating cases.
Concerns about the difficulty and impropriety of balancing free exercise
rights and competing state interests was clearly one of the central themes of
the Court’s opinion in Smith II, which Justice Stevens joined.198
The policing of religious expression by government to determine
whether it constitutes a prohibited endorsement, on the other hand, arguably
197

Justice O’Connor recognized the implausibility of the government’s completely refraining from
religious communication in the pledge of allegiance case when she stated that eradicating religious
references entirely would “sever ties to a history that sustains this Nation even today.” See Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 36 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Using
the constitutional shorthand of ceremonial deism, Justice O’Connor described how religious
references—limited by their history, ubiquity, absence of worship, and lack of reference to a particular
religion—can serve constitutionally acceptable, secular purposes. Id. at 37–44.
Other scholars have discussed the concept at length. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The First
Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503,
520–21 (1992) (finding “safe, under any Establishment Clause ‘test,’” the observance of Christmas and
Thanksgiving, “In God We Trust” on currency, and “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 207 n.59 (1992) (arguing that
“we need not melt down the national currency to get rid of ‘In God We Trust’” since it is at most a de
minimis endorsement).
198
See Smith II, 494 U.S. 872, 888–89 (1990).
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avoids the kind of subjective balancing required by a rigorous free exercise
regime. Indeed, it does not require any comparison of rights and competing
state interests at all. Thus, the enforcement of this constitutional guarantee
by the judiciary does not exceed the competence of courts or assign to
judges the kind of policy choices that are more appropriately determined by
the political branches of government.
This argument is subject to two powerful rejoinders, however. First,
judicial evaluation of state-sponsored prayers and religious displays to
determine whether they constitute an impermissible endorsement of religion
may be as subjective, value-laden, and unpredictable as the adjudication of
free exercise claims under some form of rigorous scrutiny. Second,
assigning decisions as to whether or not to grant a religious accommodation
to the political branches of government may not avoid subjective and
indeterminate judicial evaluations of these accommodations. Establishment
Clause review to determine whether discretionary accommodations favor
certain faiths over others and whether they burden nonbeneficiaries to an
unacceptable extent may turn out to be just as value-laden and uncertain as
the adjudication of free exercise claims in the first place.
a. Subjectivity in policing endorsements.—It is not at all clear
that the adjudication of free exercise claims is as uniquely vulnerable to
concerns about unpredictability and subjectivity as the above criticism
suggests. Determining what constitutes an impermissible endorsement or
advancement of religion by government speech and sponsored activities
may be as subjective, unpredictable, and value-laden a decisionmaking
process as balancing a free exercise claim against the state’s interest in
refusing to grant an exemption from a general law. While identifying
prohibited endorsements of religion does not involve formal balancing, it
requires a relatively open-ended evaluation of “social facts”199 based on the
text and history of state action and the cultural environment200 in which the

199

See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Although
evidentiary submissions may help answer it, the question is, like the question whether racial or sexbased classifications communicate an invidious message, in large part a legal question to be answered on
the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.”). Justice Stevens clearly considered such social facts
in his opinion in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 307–08 (2000), in which
he examined the history and context of prayers offered at school-sponsored athletic functions in
applying the Establishment Clause.
200
See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 775–76 (1995) (O’Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (evaluating the open nature of the forum, private
ownership of the display, and presence of a sign disclaiming government sponsorship); Cnty. of
Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 633–35 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (evaluating the physical setting and context of
pluralism in which religious symbols were displayed); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (evaluating the content and overall holiday setting in which the créche was displayed in
determining whether it endorses Christianity).
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alleged endorsement occurs.201 That analysis has proven to be as subjective
and unpredictable as balancing.
The indeterminacy and subjectivity inherent in applying the
endorsement test has been recognized by numerous commentators.202 In
part, this is because social facts are often in the eye of the beholder. The
reasonable objective observer, whose assessment controls the court’s
analysis of whether an endorsement exists, has to view a religious display
from some perspective, and the range of such perspectives in American
society is very broad. Put simply, there does not seem to be any consensus
on the meaning of social facts when religious displays are at issue. This
problem is theoretically solvable: the Court could adopt one perspective
through which all endorsement questions would be answered. But it has not
done so, and there is little evidence that even those Justices who support the
endorsement test can agree on its meaning or application.
Justice O’Connor, who created the endorsement test, for example,
disagreed with Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens as to what
constituted an endorsement of religion in Lynch v. Donnelly,203 a case
upholding a government sponsored and subsidized Christmas display
including a crèche, Santa’s house, a sleigh pulled by reindeer, a wishing
well, and other figures and structures204 against an Establishment Clause
challenge. To Justice O’Connor, the display at issue did not endorse
Christianity. Its purpose and effect “was not promotion of the religious
content of the crèche but celebration of the public holiday [of Christmas]

201

Even Justice Scalia resorts to his subjective understanding of social facts in reviewing the
constitutionality of religious displays. In challenging the majority’s contention that the Ten
Commandments display at issue advanced a particular religion because it adopted one version of the Ten
Commandments, Justice Scalia offered two responses. First, he suggested that “the display of the Ten
Commandments alongside eight secular documents, and the plaque’s explanation for their inclusion,
make clear they were not posted to take sides in a theological dispute.” McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of
Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 894 n.4 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Second, he argued that
[t]he sectarian dispute regarding text, if serious, is not widely known. I doubt that most religious
adherents are even aware that there are competing versions with doctrinal consequences (I
certainly was not). In any event, the context of the display here could not conceivably cause the
viewer to believe that the government was taking sides in a doctrinal controversy.
Id. at 909 n.12. This analysis is, obviously, a highly subjective interpretation of social facts, and one on
which scholars disagree. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn
and Elsewhere, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1482–83 (2005) (describing the debate over the different
interpretations and translations of the Ten Commandments).
202
See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL.
499, 510–21 (2002); William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It” The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 533–35 (1986); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 148–57 (1992); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and
Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the ‘No-Endorsement’ Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266,
292–95 (1987).
203
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690–91 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
204
Id. at 671–72 (majority opinion).
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through its traditional symbols.”205 While the dissenting Justices did not
adopt the endorsement test as the framework for adjudicating Establishment
Clause disputes relating to religious displays, they left little doubt that that
they considered the crèche display to be an unconstitutional endorsement of
Christian beliefs. By including a nativity scene in the display, the city
placed “the government’s imprimatur of approval on the particular religious
beliefs exemplified by the crèche. Those who believe in the message of the
nativity receive the unique and exclusive benefit of public recognition and
approval of their views.”206
The disarray and differing perspectives were even more pronounced in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter.207 At issue, in
part, in this case was the constitutionality of a Pittsburgh holiday display
identified by a sign stating “Salute to Liberty”208 and including a forty-fivefoot Christmas tree and an eighteen-foot Chanukah menorah.209 Justice
Blackmun adopted the endorsement test and concluded that the dual display
and sign communicated a message of “of cultural diversity” rather than an
endorsement of Christianity and Judaism.210 In Justice Blackmun’s
judgment, the Christmas tree was understood to be a secular symbol.211 The
Chanukah menorah was more of a religious symbol, but in the context of
the December holiday season both Chanukah and the menorah became
increasingly secularized.212 The religious meaning of the menorah might
still raise constitutional concerns about its inclusion in the display, but
because no less religious, alternative symbol of Chanukah was available to
celebrate the holiday in more secular terms, the display survived
constitutional review.213
Justice O’Connor agreed with Justice Blackmun’s conclusion, but not
with his analysis.214 She argued that Chanukah and the menorah were
intrinsically religious.215 To Justice O’Connor, the “the specific practice in
question in its particular physical setting and context” including the sign,
the Christmas tree, and the menorah communicated a message of pluralism
rather than endorsement.216
205

Id. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
207
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
208
Id. at 582 (internal quotation marks omitted). The full message on the sign stated: “During this
holiday season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the
keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
209
Id. at 587.
210
Id. at 619.
211
See id. at 616–17.
212
See id. at 617–18.
213
See id.
214
See id. at 632–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
215
Id. at 633–34.
216
Id. at 636–37.
206
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Justice Brennan disagreed with both Justices Blackmun and
O’Connor.217 He suggested that it was much more likely that the menorah
reinforced the religious significance of the Christmas tree than it was that
the tree somehow secularized the menorah.218 More importantly, Justice
Brennan seemed to challenge the idea that an “endorsement” of religion
depended on the understanding of a “reasonable observer” with specific
ideas about the context of a display.219 Such a standard, he suggested, would
make the Court’s analysis “under the Establishment Clause look more like
an exam in Art 101 than an inquiry into constitutional law.”220
Justice Stevens wrote separately. While he eschewed identifying the
constitutional infirmity with religious displays as “coercion,”
“endorsement,” or “state action with the purpose and effect of providing
support for specific faiths,”221 Justice Stevens maintained that the
Establishment Clause creates “a strong presumption against the display of
religious symbols on public property.”222 This presumption, however, is
hardly conclusive, “for it will prohibit a display only when its message,
evaluated in the context in which it is presented, is nonsecular.”223 The dual
display in the instant case was not sufficiently nonsecular in its message to
avoid invalidation as a double establishment of religion.224
While the strength of the presumption against government-sponsored
religious displays on public property advocated by Justice Stevens has the
potential to limit the scope of this problem, it cannot eliminate uncertainty
and subjectivity in adjudicating this class of cases. Justice Stevens’s
analysis requires “th[e] careful consideration of context,”225 and contextual
analysis is necessarily indeterminate. Thus, Justice Stevens recognizes
numerous circumstances where government-sponsored displays with
religious content would not violate the Establishment Clause. The inclusion
of secular figures as well as religious leaders may neutralize the message of
a display.226 The presentation of clearly religious works of art in a public
museum reflects the quality of the work, not the content of the painting or
sculpture.227 State action that acknowledges “the religious beliefs and
practices of the American people” is not intrinsically unconstitutional.228
217

Id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 642.
219
Id. at 642–43.
220
Id. at 643.
221
Id. at 649–50 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
222
Id. at 650.
223
Id. at 652.
224
See id. at 653–54.
225
Id. at 653.
226
See id. at 652–53.
227
See id. at 653.
228
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 711 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Historical documents with religious content may be publicly displayed.229
There may be a place for ceremonial deism.230 Religious statements by
public officials may reflect the permissible personal statements of
individuals rather than the voice of the government.231
This list is not exclusive, nor could it be. Given the history, culture,
and religious demography of the United States, questions regarding the
constitutionality of religious displays and messages will always involve
some significant level of uncertainty. That reality does not necessarily
undermine Justice Stevens’s insistence on a strong presumption that
government-sponsored religious displays violate the Establishment Clause.
This comparison between the ambiguities of the endorsement test and the
uncertainty intrinsic to free exercise balancing, however, raises questions
about whether both constitutional inquiries are equally problematic, and,
accordingly, whether they both should be equally acceptable or
unacceptable for religion clause purposes.232
b. Subjective balancing is unavoidable.—Another open area of
inquiry involves a more fundamental challenge to the antibalancing
arguments that are so intrinsic to the reasoning of the Smith II decision, and,
perhaps, to Justice Stevens’s free exercise jurisprudence. The challenge to
the judicial competence and propriety arguments set out in Smith II extends
beyond the argument that applying the endorsement test in religious display
and public prayer cases involves a similar degree of subjectivity and
balancing as the adjudication of free exercise claims for exemptions from
neutral laws of general applicability. What if the review of discretionary
accommodations of religion under Establishment Clause auspices required
the Court to engage in the same kind of subjective, unpredictable, and
value-laden balancing of religious liberty and state interests that the
majority opinion in Smith II so forcefully rejected for the adjudication of
free exercise claims?
Part III of this Article identified two principles that Justice Stevens
considered in determining whether a discretionary accommodation of
religion violated the Establishment Clause. First, some accommodations
violate religious equality principles and provide exemptions to preferred
229

Id.
See id. at 711, 723; supra note 197. The idea and scope of ceremonial deism remains
controversial. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious
Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1574–83 (2010); Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality
of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2137–54 (1996).
231
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 723 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232
See generally Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why
the Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause Are
Stronger when Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701, 1721–24 (2011) (arguing
that the applications of the endorsement and free exercise balancing tests are equally vulnerable to the
criticism that they involve subjective and indeterminate decisionmaking by the judiciary).
230
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faiths while denying comparable exemptions sought by other religions.233
Second, some accommodations simply go too far and unfairly privilege
religion at the expense of third parties, nonbelievers, and the general
public.234 I agree that these are both important Establishment Clause
constraints on the constitutionality of accommodations. I also suggest,
however, that it is difficult to enforce either principle without engaging in
the same kind of subjective, indeterminate, and value-laden balancing
analysis that the Court identified as a primary reason for substantially
limiting the scope of free exercise rights in Smith II.
Consider how a court can determine whether a legislative
accommodation violates equality principles by impermissibly preferring
some faiths over others. Some cases, of course, would be easy to resolve.
Assume a state law allows Jewish students attending public school to be
excused from the state’s compulsory attendance requirements on religious
holidays but denies Buddhist and Hindu students a comparable
accommodation. That is an easy law to invalidate under the Establishment
Clause, but it is extremely unlikely that a blatantly discriminatory law like
this one would be enacted in the first place.
Now consider a more common kind of a case. The federal government
for many years has exempted the Native American Church (and more
recently the members of all recognized Indian tribes) from the ban on using
peyote imposed by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).235 Reasoning by
analogy from that exemption, members of other faiths argued that they
should be relieved of the obligations of the CSA that prevent them from
using other prohibited substances in their religious rituals. Ethiopian Zion
Coptic Church members, Rastafarians, and others demanded an
accommodation for the use of marijuana.236 Members of other faiths have
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See supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 154–62 and accompanying text.
235
42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2006).
236
See, e.g., Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458, 1463–64 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (acknowledging that federal
court is compelled to adjudicate a claim of denominational preference based on allowing an exemption
for religious use of peyote by Native American Church members while denying an exemption for
religious use of marijuana by Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church members); Olsen v. Iowa, 808 F.2d 652,
653 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (confirming the conviction of a member of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic
Church for possession of marijuana); United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 513 (1st Cir. 1984) (denying
a religious exemption to controlled substances laws for members of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church);
McBride v. Shawnee Cnty., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1100–01 (D. Kan. 1999) (recognizing that a state
cannot treat Rastafarian religion less favorably than the Native American Church if both religions are
similarly situated, but concluding that they are not).
234
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sought237 and may well seek exemptions for the ritual use of other restricted
substances. How should a court go about evaluating these claims?238
There is no mystery here as to the kind of analysis courts apply to these
claims. Indeed, these kinds of arguments have been raised and adjudicated
on several occasions by lower courts. In most cases, courts evaluate the
state’s interest in denying the sought-after accommodation to determine if it
is substantially different and more important than the state’s interest in
restricting access to peyote by Native Americans.239 For example, an
exemption for the religious use of peyote might be more easily controlled
and less burdensome to law enforcement than exemptions for the religious
use of marijuana.240
Courts consider these and other arguments to determine if the costs to
society of granting an exemption for the religious use of marijuana justify
the different treatment provided to the two controlled substances. If the
costs are sufficiently different, the courts will distinguish the state’s interest
in these two situations and reject the claim for an accommodation for the
religious use of marijuana.241 Just how much of a difference between the
costs of the two accommodations being compared to each other will justify
treating them differently is necessarily an open and subjective inquiry.
This kind of an inquiry, however, bears an uncomfortable resemblance
to the balancing analysis that the majority opinion in Smith II deplores.
Balancing tests in free exercise cases do not weigh the value of one
religious practice over another.242 Once a court concludes that the right is
burdened or abridged, the court’s focus is almost always on the nature and
importance of the state’s interest that conflicts with the exercise of a right. It
will evaluate the sufficiency and importance of the state’s interest and
whether alternative regulations are available that would adequately further
that interest while imposing a less serious burden on the exercise of the
237

See, e.g., Gonzalez v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 425–26
(2006) (arguing for an exemption for hoasca tea under RFRA).
238
While courts sometimes construed these arguments to raise equal protection claims, they are
more appropriately evaluated under the Establishment Clause. See Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d at 1468
(Buckley, J., dissenting).
239
See, e.g., id. at 1462–63 (majority opinion); Rush, 738 F.2d at 512–13; McBride, 71 F. Supp. 2d
at 1100–02. But see Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Meese, 698 F. Supp. 1342, 1349 (N.D. Tex.
1988) (finding no need to compare the state interest in prohibiting other religious groups from using
peyote because the Native American Church exemption is unique).
240
Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d at 1463 (distinguishing availability and risk of abuse of marijuana from
availability and risk of abuse of peyote); Olsen v. Iowa, 808 F.2d at 653 (distinguishing ceremonial use
of peyote in “controlled and isolated circumstances” with “Coptic Church members’ continuous and
public use of marijuana”); Rush, 738 F.2d at 513 (distinguishing the burden on law enforcement
resulting from exemptions for peyote and marijuana); McBride, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1101–02
(distinguishing marijuana and peyote exemptions in terms of enforcement difficulties and risk of abuse).
241
See cases cited supra note 240.
242
See Smith II, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (explaining that it is inappropriate and beyond their
competence for courts to evaluate the centrality or merits of different religious claims).
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right.243 That is a pretty fair description of the analysis a court employs to
determine whether the granting of one religious accommodation but not
another constitutes unconstitutional preferentialism in violation of the
Establishment Clause.
One might argue that the Establishment Clause inquiry is less
subjective, indeterminate, and value laden than a free exercise balancing
test. Reviewing the constitutionality of an accommodation on equality
grounds requires a comparison between prior exemptions that were granted
and current law that fails to include an accommodation in arguably similar
circumstances. The application of rigorous scrutiny in a free exercise case
involves an ad hoc and independent weighing of the state’s interest against
the value of religious freedom to the individual asserting the claim.
Balancing is a more open-ended inquiry than a comparative analysis.
The difference between these two forms of review may be much more
modest than this argument suggests, however. As noted, most of what a
court weighs when it applies a balancing test is focused on the state’s side
of the scale. Moreover, American constitutional law cases depend on
reasoning by analogy whether the court is comparing one religious
accommodation against another or balancing the state’s interest against the
claimant’s free exercise right. In reviewing free exercise claims for
constitutionally mandated accommodations, the history of prior regulations
and decisions granting or denying sought-after accommodations will form
the foundation for legal argument in cases asserting new claims.244 The
analysis courts employ in an Establishment Clause case involving
discretionary accommodations is substantially similar. Once a state grants
or refuses to grant a discretionary accommodation to a religious group for a
particular practice, courts will compare the cost or risks associated with that
decision to other accommodation decisions in evaluating claims of
favoritism or discriminatory treatment.245 Whether the court is protecting
243

See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–60 (1982) (focusing on importance of state
interest and extent to which religious exemption will interfere with it); People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813,
818–19 (Cal. 1964).
244
See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 701–08 (1986) (discussing prior free exercise cases and
accommodation statutes in evaluating plaintiff’s free exercise claim); United States v. Middleton, 690
F.2d 820, 824–25 (11th Cir. 1982) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument analogizing an Amish community’s
religious liberty interest in controlling the education of their children, upheld in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972), to a Coptic community’s liberty interest in the religious use of marijuana because of
the “difference in the nature of the governmental interests involved in the two cases”). Indeed, it is not
uncommon for courts to adjudicate claims of religious discrimination under the Free Exercise Clause
rather than the Establishment Clause because the analysis is so similar in both cases. See, e.g., Town v.
Reno, 377 So. 2d 648, 651 (Fla. 1979).
245
See supra notes 239–43. Judge Buckley’s dissenting opinion in Olsen v. DEA provides a
particularly effective illustration of how these cases should be reviewed. 878 F. 2d at 1468–72 (Buckley,
J., dissenting); see also In re Springmoor, Inc., 498 S.E.2d 177, 181–83 (N.C. 1998) (distinguishing the
tax exemption for religiously affiliated homes for the aged, sick, and infirm from the tax exemption for
all houses of worship upheld in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
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religious liberty in a free exercise case or enforcing religious equality under
the Establishment Clause, some form of a comparative weighing of the
state’s interest is likely to be a significant part of its reasoning. If that
analysis is unacceptably unpredictable and subjective, it is likely to be
vulnerable to that criticism in both kinds of cases, not just in free exercise
litigation.
An even stronger argument about the unavoidability of subjective
inquiries akin to balancing in accommodation cases applies in cases in
which an accommodation is challenged on the ground that it extends too far
and burdens nonbeneficiaries to an unacceptable extent. Consider the words
used by the Court to describe this constitutional constraint. The Court
invalidates accommodations that assign an “unyielding weighting in favor
of [religious accommodations] over all other interests . . . .”246 If this
language means that a discretionary accommodation of religious exercise
must be susceptible to being outweighed by countervailing state interests, it
would seem to require some form of balancing analysis to determine if a
challenged accommodation withstands Establishment Clause review.
Alternatively, the Court questions whether an accommodation would
be constitutional if it “burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly.”247 Most
recently, the Court concluded that to avoid an as-applied challenge under
the Establishment Clause, a general accommodation statute “must take
adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose
on nonbeneficiaries . . . .”248 In addition, accommodations may not be
“excessive” or “jeopardize the effective functioning of an
institution . . . .”249 Certainly, one may argue that these vague standards are
as subjective and indeterminate as the application of strict scrutiny review
to a neutral law of general applicability that substantially burdens the
exercise of religion.
Indeed, the indeterminate nature of the Court’s review of religious
accommodations under the Establishment Clause can be demonstrated not
only by reference to what the Court says in its opinions, but also in the
diversity of its holdings. Over the last forty years, the Court struck down
religious accommodations in Texas Monthly,250 Estate of Thornton,251 Kiryas
Joel,252 and Larson253 on Establishment Clause grounds. It has upheld
246

Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985).
Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989).
248
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).
249
Id. at 726.
250
489 U.S. at 5 (striking a Texas law that exempted religious periodicals from sales tax).
251
472 U.S. at 708–11 (striking a Connecticut law that gave Sabbath observers an absolute and
unqualified right to not work on their day of Sabbath).
252
512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (striking a New York law that carved out a special school district for
an enclave of a religious group).
253
456 U.S. 228, 230, 255 (1982) (striking a Minnesota statute that imposed requirements on
religious groups that solicited nonmembers for over half of their funds).
247
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accommodations in Gillette v. United States,254 Amos,255 and Cutter.256
Justice Stevens wasn’t on the Court when Gillette was decided, but the
overall point here extends beyond Justice Stevens’s jurisprudence. It is
extremely difficult to reconcile the holdings of these cases in terms of the
burdens the accommodations impose on nonbeneficiaries or the degree to
which they favor some faiths over others.257
C. The Isolation of Disfavored Minority Faiths
The foregoing discussion focused on the justifications for free exercise
doctrine that rejects constitutionally mandated exemptions. It attempted to
present an ongoing and continuing dialogue on challenges to this approach
using the constitutional values Justice Stevens has recognized in the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause opinions he has written and joined to
guide the conversation. There is no concluding resolution to this kind of a
discussion. The arguments back and forth could continue well beyond the
pages allocated for this symposium issue.
However, there is another argument about free exercise exemptions
that has not been covered yet that merits some additional discussion. The
constitutional framework addressed so far examines the costs of a regime
that rejects all constitutionally mandated exemptions. But there may be
uniquely problematic costs resulting from a more rigorous free exercise
doctrine that requires exemptions in some cases but not others. The
argument here in support of Justice Stevens’s equality-based, free exercise
jurisprudence has considerable persuasive power. No plausible free exercise
standard of review will require accommodations in all cases. The number of
254

401 U.S. 437, 454 (1971) (upholding a conscription law as neutral and secular).
483 U.S. 327, 329 (1987) (upholding a section of the Civil Rights Act that “exempt[ed] religious
organizations from Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination in employment on the basis of
religion”).
256
544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (upholding the institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA).
257
The Title VII amendments allowing religious organizations to discriminate in hiring, upheld in
Amos, for example, may result in nonbeneficiaries suffering severe burdens. The plaintiff in Amos lost a
job that he had held for sixteen years. 483 U.S. at 330. In Texas Monthly, the cost to taxpayers of
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claims that will be rejected may vary with the rigor of the review applied.
Whatever standard of review is employed, however, in some circumstances
the state’s interests will outweigh the free exercise rights of the religious
claimant.
The results of such litigation may leave some minority faiths in a more
painful situation than they would have been in under the regime created in
Smith II that rejects all claims—regardless of the religious practice at issue
or the insubstantiality of the state’s interest. Put simply, any attempt to
protect religious liberty through some kind of balancing analysis will help
some minority faiths but at the cost of increasing the injury to other small
religions, unconventional religions, or both. The granting of
accommodations to some faiths and not others will increase the sense of
isolation and ill-treatment experienced by those minority faiths denied an
exemption. Whatever feelings of discrimination and disfavored status a
minority faith may experience if its claim for an accommodation is rejected
will be magnified substantially if other small faiths receive exemptions for
their religious practices. It is bad enough to be treated less favorably than
the majority. It is far worse to be singled out as one of the few minority
faiths that are undeserving of accommodation.
An illustration of the burden of being singled out among minorities for
disfavored treatment, although not in the context of an exemption from
general laws, can be found in the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Simpson v.
Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors.258 Simpson involved a County
Board of Supervisors policy requiring the offering of a “non-sectarian
invocation” before the Board began its legislative sessions.259 In
administering the offering of these invocations, the Board’s clerk invited
clergy and leaders from all of the religious congregations in the county to
participate in its program.260 Clergy who responded affirmatively to this
invitation were scheduled to offer the invocation on a first-come, first-serve
basis.261
When Cynthia Simpson, a spiritual leader of the Wicca religion, asked
to be included on the list of religious leaders scheduled to offer the
invocation, however, the Board refused to permit her to do so262—ostensibly
because she was not a member of a monotheistic congregation. Simpson
sued alleging a violation of both of the religion clauses of the First
Amendment.263 A Fourth Circuit panel upheld the county’s policy.264

258
259
260
261
262
263
264

404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 278.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id. at 279–80.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 288.

649

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

There are many things wrong with the court’s opinion in the Simpson
case. But the greatest defect is the court’s inability to understand why the
county’s policy was constitutionally objectionable. The court noted that in
Marsh v. Chambers, the Supreme Court rejected an Establishment Clause
challenge to the state legislature of Nebraska’s hiring of a Presbyterian
minister to serve as legislative chaplain and to open each session of the
legislature with a prayer.265 The same Presbyterian minister had held the
position for sixteen years.266 To the Fourth Circuit panel in Simpson,
Chesterfield County’s policy was “in many ways more inclusive than that
approved by the Marsh Court.”267 Indeed, the court explained, “[i]n contrast
to Marsh’s single Presbyterian clergyman, the County welcomes rabbis,
imams, priests, pastors, and ministers. Chesterfield not only sought but
achieved diversity. Its first-come, first-serve system led to prayers being
given by a wide cross-section of the County’s religious leaders.”268
Simpson’s attempt to interpret “the County’s inclusiveness as a negative”
simply made no sense to the court.269
I am confident that Justice Stevens would have had little difficulty in
understanding both the power and the merits of Simpson’s claim and in
rejecting the myopic understanding of Establishment Clause concerns
exhibited by the Fourth Circuit panel. While the appointment of a minister
from one Protestant denomination as legislative chaplain for sixteen years
may be problematic, the harm caused by such religious favoritism is fairly
widespread. In 2000, there were 39,000 Presbyterians in Nebraska who
attended church services out of a total population of 1,000,000 churchgoers.270 It would be difficult to argue that the overwhelming majority of
religious non-Protestant Nebraskans experienced the legislature’s decision
as directly deprecating their faith. Surely, a policy that permitted members
of the clergy of any denomination to serve as legislative chaplain except
Presbyterians would communicate a very different and more invidious and
hurtful message. The Chesterfield County policy communicated just such a
message of exclusion and unworthiness to Ms. Simpson and her coreligionists. The experience of being the only religion denied the
opportunity to offer a prayer at legislative sessions—an opportunity
provided to a host of other religious leaders and congregations—is
distinctively alienating and oppressive. Justice Stevens’s concerns about the
state accommodating some religions but not others271 reflects his
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appreciation of the uniquely stigmatizing consequences that this kind of
unequal treatment may inflict on minority faiths.
As the above discussion illustrates, allowing courts, the political
branches of government, or both to grant religious accommodations not
only risks decisions based on religious familiarity and favoritism, but may
also substantially magnify the injury experienced by minority faiths whose
claims for exemptions from neutral laws are denied. These risks and costs
are real, but there is an additional and arguably offsetting value to requiring
religious exemptions in appropriate cases that needs to be taken into
account as well. Granting judicial or legislative accommodations to some
faiths may well create risks of increased isolation for small and less wellknown religions, but it also provides legal tools to minority faiths that they
may use to their advantage. Once an accommodation is granted to one faith,
the decision to do so becomes a wedge that other faiths may employ to pry
open the door to additional exemptions.
If either a court or a legislature determines that an exemption from a
neutral law for one religious practice does not unacceptably interfere with
the state’s interest furthered by the law, the fact of that exemption
necessarily undermines the government’s ability to assert that same state
interest as a justification for denying exemptions for other religious
practices. The Court’s reasoning in Gonzalez v. O Centro Espírita
Beneficente União do Vegetal persuasively illustrates the utility of pointing
to prior exemptions in arguing against the state’s justifications for denying
accommodations.272 Although O Centro involved a statutory claim under the
RFRA rather than a free exercise claim, the statutory standard required by
the federal law, strict scrutiny, was the same standard of review applied in
many fundamental rights cases and pre-Smith free exercise cases.
At issue in O Centro was an RFRA claim brought by a very small
religious sect, O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal (UDV),
seeking to enjoin the federal government from interfering with their use of
hoasca, a sacramental tea, in religious rituals.273 Hoasca tea contains a
hallucinogen, the possession and use of which is prohibited by the CSA.274
In defending its refusal to exempt the religious use of hoasca tea from the
requirements of the CSA, the government argued that hoasca tea “has a
high potential for abuse” and that individuals ingesting the drug are exposed
to serious health risks.275
In rejecting the government’s argument, the Court noted that very
similar risks exist with regard to the ingestion of mescaline, an ingredient in
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peyote.276 Yet the federal government granted an exemption for the religious
use of peyote to Native Americans.277 Thus, the Court wondered:
[i]f such use is permitted . . . for hundreds of thousands of Native Americans
practicing their faith, it is difficult to see how those same findings alone can
preclude any consideration of a similar exception for the 130 or so American
members of the UDV who want to practice theirs.278

Similarly, when the government argued “that the effectiveness of the
Controlled Substances Act will be ‘necessarily . . . undercut’ if the Act is
not uniformly applied,” the Court was not persuaded.279 “The peyote
exception,” it pointed out, “has been in place since the outset of the
Controlled Substances Act, and there is no evidence that it has ‘undercut’
the Government’s ability to enforce the ban on peyote use by nonIndians.”280
The Court’s analysis in O Centro is neither surprising nor
unconventional. Existing religious accommodations are an intrinsic part of
the framework of law and fact through which the denial of other claims for
accommodation will be vetted.281 Few arguments could be more effective in
challenging the denial of a requested accommodation than a reference to
other accommodations granted by the state to which a meaningful analogy
can be drawn.
A related, but less precise, example may also help to illustrate the costs
and benefits of a policy providing accommodations to religious groups. In
Board of Education v. Mergens, the Court interpreted the federal Equal
Access Act and upheld its application against an Establishment Clause
challenge.282 The goal of the Equal Access Act was to prevent public
secondary schools from denying student religious groups access to school
property for religious meetings.283 To accomplish this objective, the Act
provided that public secondary schools receiving federal financial support
which permit “one or more noncurriculum related students groups to meet
on school premises” may not deny equal access to other student groups
because of the religious, political, or philosophical content of the student
groups’ programs.284 The Court interpreted the Act broadly to apply to any
school that permitted student groups not directly related to the school’s
curriculum, such as the chess club, to hold meetings on school property.285
276
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Because the student religious clubs at issue were not created, sponsored, or
controlled by the school, permitting them to meet on school property did
not violate the Establishment Clause.286
Justice Stevens dissented, challenging the majority’s interpretation of
the Act. Justice Stevens argued that the purpose of the law was to prohibit
schools which permitted student groups advocating “partisan theological,
political, or ethical views” to meet on school premises from discriminating
among the advocacy clubs seeking access on the basis of the content of
their views.287 Such a law would conform to the Court’s forum analysis and
would not raise serious Establishment Clause issues.288 Under the Court’s
construction of the Act, however, the Equal Access Act would require
public schools to allow student religious clubs to hold meetings on school
property even when the school’s policy had been to deny access to
controversial, partisan advocacy groups. This interpretation of the law
provided religious clubs a special accommodation that raised serious
Establishment Clause questions about the secular purpose of the law and
whether its effect impermissibly advanced religion—although these
concerns probably did not require the invalidation of the Act.289
Justice Stevens focused on the negative burdens imposed by the Act on
schools that had no intention of creating forums for student advocacy
groups on school property. In order to limit access to religious advocacy
groups, he suggested, schools would have to close their doors to “familiar
and innocuous activities” such as the chess club or a cheerleader squad.290
Thus, the Act, under the majority’s analysis, “comes perilously close to an
outright command to allow organized prayer, and perhaps . . . religious
ceremonies . . . on school premises.”291
While the goal of the Equal Access Act may have focused on
providing religious clubs greater opportunities to meet on school premises,
the implementation of the Act over time had far broader consequences.
Student gay–straight alliance clubs have used the statutory prohibition
against discrimination to support their claim to access to school premises.292
At least one commentator has suggested that gay–straight alliances in
public high schools have been the biggest “beneficiary of the Equal Access
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Act . . . .”293 Student atheist clubs have also used the Act to seek access to
school premises.294 Thus, an accommodation adopted to provide access for
religious groups led unexpectedly to equal access for many other
organizations that were not the intended beneficiaries of the statute. Just as
an accommodation of one religion may open the door for accommodations
for other faiths, the accommodation of religion generally may open the door
for accommodations for nonreligious individuals or groups as well.295
These examples do not dispute the concern that the granting of specific
accommodations by either the courts or the legislatures risks the increased
isolation and alienation of particular faiths. That possibility cannot be
lightly dismissed. It is also true, however, that the granting of
accommodations to more familiar and accepted minority faiths may provide
the best, and perhaps the only, foundation for other religious minorities to
persuasively argue their own religious liberty claim. Even a generic
accommodation for religion may help nonreligious groups to obtain
opportunities or exemptions that would otherwise be unavailable to them.
Of course, weighing the risk of increased isolation against the opportunity
for increased accommodation over time is not a calculation that can be
performed with any degree of accuracy. But that is the point here. Judicial
and legislative accommodations of religious groups create both risks and
opportunities for other faiths. That uncertainty suggests that it is hard to
generalize about the costs and benefits for religious equality of a regime
that is open to the granting of religious accommodations. The argument that
the granting of some accommodations increases inequality and stigma
rather than reducing it invites further discussion as the constitutional
dialogue continues.
CONCLUSION
Justice Stevens was a formidable presence on the United States
Supreme Court for over three decades. His views on the religion clauses of
the First Amendment represent a significant part of his constitutional law
jurisprudence. During his tenure, Justice Stevens had few peers on the
Court that could match his commitment to the rigorous enforcement of
Establishment Clause guarantees. Justice Stevens was also well known for
arguing that the Free Exercise Clause did not protect religious individuals
or institutions against neutral laws of general applicability—a position that
eventually commanded the support of a majority of the court.
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The ostensible dissonance between Justice Stevens’s expansive
interpretation of the Establishment Clause and his much more limited
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause rests on a unifying foundation—
Justice Stevens’s concerns about religious equality. To Justice Stevens, the
Establishment Clause requirement that laws must further a secular purpose
served as a check on state action that impermissibly favored majoritarian
religious beliefs. In a similar vein, Justice Stevens insisted that statesponsored public prayer and religious displays violated the Establishment
Clause because they offended religious minorities and nonbelievers and
undermined their status in the community.
Justice Stevens’s reluctance to permit free exercise challenges against
neutral laws of general applicability was also grounded in concerns about
religious equality. If the federal courts adjudicated free exercise claims,
they would end up, inevitably, protecting the practices of certain faiths but
not others. Balancing state interests against free exercise was an
intrinsically subjective and value-laden process that exceeded both the
competence and the legitimate role of federal judges. To Justice Stevens,
the inequality of results intrinsic to such an adjudicatory mechanism was
constitutionally unacceptable.
What we can learn about Justice Stevens’s interpretation of the religion
clauses, gleaned from the many opinions he authored or joined, raises as
many questions as it answers, however. One may argue, for example, with
considerable persuasive force, that many neutral laws of general
applicability are drafted to avoid conflicts with the practices of large and
politically powerful faiths. Accordingly, denying religious accommodations
to minority faiths burdened by such laws will result in the very same
inequality of treatment between majority and minority faiths that Justice
Stevens so frequently and eloquently condemned in his Establishment
Clause opinions. Indeed, the alienation and marginalization experienced by
religious minorities whose ability to practice their faith is burdened by
general laws may be as severe as any affront they experience from public
prayers or religious displays that favor other religions.
Alternative reasons for denying all free exercise claims against neutral
laws of general applicability are subject to serious challenges as well. The
subjectivity inherent in free exercise balancing may be no more subjective
and unpredictable than the task of determining when state-sponsored
prayers and religious displays impermissibly endorse religion—a judicial
function that Justice Stevens repeatedly supported. Indeed, it is not even
clear that assigning the problem of granting or denying religious
accommodations to the political branches of government frees the judiciary
from value-laden and indeterminate inquiries into accommodation disputes.
Justice Stevens insisted that the Establishment Clause required federal
judicial evaluation of discretionary accommodations to determine if such
exemptions favored some faiths over others and whether they imposed
unfair and excessive burdens on nonbeneficiaries. These tasks, however,
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involve the same kind of subjective and open-ended analysis that the Court,
with Justice Stevens’s assent, condemned in free exercise cases.
Ultimately, these and other questions remain unanswered and are open
to ongoing analysis and debate. The final chapters of Justice Stevens’s
jurisprudence were not completed when he retired from the Court. They are
still being written in scholarly discussions in this symposium and other
sources. The discussion of the jurisprudence of great Supreme Court
Justices continues far beyond their tenure on the Court.
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